942 F.3d 372
7th Cir.2019Background
- Amanda Burger was an employee of the Macon County State’s Attorney’s Office from 2010 until her May 2016 discharge.
- Elected State’s Attorney Albert Scott and Assistant State’s Attorney Nichole Kroncke supervised the office; Burger alleged Kroncke had hiring/firing authority and began mistreating her after Burger reported Kroncke’s misconduct to Scott.
- Burger was terminated at a May 19, 2016 meeting with Scott and Kroncke; the stated reason was Burger’s association with her husband, a prior felony convict.
- Two years later Burger sued, asserting state-law claims and a single federal § 1983 claim against Macon County alleging violation of constitutional rights (intimate association and First Amendment retaliation theories).
- The district court dismissed the § 1983 count for failure to state a federal claim; Burger appealed the dismissal as to county liability under Monell.
- The Seventh Circuit considered whether the alleged firing was an act attributable to Macon County (i.e., part of a county policy) under Illinois law and federal Monell precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Macon County can be liable under § 1983 for Burger's firing (Monell) | Burger: her firing reflected a county policy or official act that deprived her constitutional rights | County: the decision was made by state officers (State’s Attorney and assistant); county lacked policymaking authority over internal operations | Held: No county liability—plaintiff failed to allege an official county policy; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether acts by the State’s Attorney or assistant can be county policy via delegation | Burger: decisionmakers’ acts should be attributable to county if they performed county functions | County: Illinois law vests exclusive control of the office’s internal operations in the State’s Attorney, so county could not delegate that authority | Held: The court found Illinois law gives exclusive control to the State’s Attorney; therefore the acts were not county policy |
| Whether the complaint’s constitutional theories required resolution | Burger: firing violated intimate-association rights and was retaliatory for protected speech | County: argued procedural defects and lack of county policy; merits of constitutional violations secondary | Held: The court did not reach the merits—Monell failure alone disposed of the § 1983 claim (noting intimate association is Fourteenth Amendment, not First) |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local governments liable under § 1983 only for their own official policies)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (policymaking authority and when an official’s act may represent government policy)
- McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (question of who is a policymaker is determined by state law)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: courts accept well-pleaded facts but not legal conclusions)
- McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 1995) (State’s Attorneys are state, not county, officers)
- People v. Nahas, 292 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (acts of an assistant State’s Attorney are treated as acts of the State’s Attorney)