Almaguer, Arturo Sanchez, PD-0989-15

Background

In November 1988 Evan and Wilda Squires were found shot to death in their trailer; no murder weapon was recovered. Investigators observed fecal matter and feces-covered clothing at the scene and a trail of clothing leading away from the trailer.
Forensic samples (fecal stains and clothing) were preserved; partial DNA profiles were generated in 2005 and compared in 2012 to a DNA sample from Arturo Sanchez Almaguer, who could not be excluded as a contributor to those profiles.
No direct eyewitness, fingerprint, ballistic link to Almaguer, or proof establishing the time of deposition of the DNA was produced; investigators acknowledged DNA was the only evidence linking Almaguer to the scene.
Almaguer was indicted on three counts of capital murder (burglary-murder), convicted by a jury, sentenced to life, and the State later dismissed one count; the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion.
Appellant (pro se and via counsel on appeal) pressed: (1) legal insufficiency because inferences from fecal-DNA were speculative and did not prove presence at the time of the killings or intent to kill; (2) the jury considered the law of parties despite no parties instruction in the charge; (3) Rule 606(b) prevented post-verdict juror inquiry and denied a fair opportunity to develop a new-trial record; (4) requested reconception of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard as a formal ‘‘single-theory’’ formula.

Issues

Issue	Almaguer's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Legal sufficiency of evidence to prove intentional killing during burglary (capital murder)	DNA from fecal matter was the only link; it does not prove presence at time of murders, firing the weapon, or intent — convictions rest on speculation	Circumstantial evidence (fresh feces, DNA at scene and at end of trail, disturbed valuables, footprints, close-range wounds) supports reasonable inferences of burglary presence and intent to kill	Court of Appeals: evidence legally sufficient when viewed in light most favorable to verdict; jury could infer burglary presence and intent (affirmed)
2. Use of law of parties without a parties instruction; jury asked for clarification during deliberations	Voir dire and prosecutor introduced parties concepts; jurors later requested parties clarification; without a parties charge jury convicted as if parties law applied — requires new trial	Information about parties given in normal voir dire is not an "outside influence"; no parties instruction was requested/required in charge and jurors’ exposure during voir dire does not invalidate verdict	Court: voir dire discussion not an improper outside influence; absence of parties charge limits conviction to defendant’s own conduct but appellate sufficiency review used principals theory; trial court did not abuse discretion denying new trial
3. Rule 606(b) and post‑verdict juror inquiry (motion for new trial)	Denial of post‑verdict questioning (juror affidavit) under Rule 606(b) prevented development of evidence that jurors relied on parties theory and produced misconduct warranting new trial	Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about deliberations; voir dire statements are not external influences; trial court properly sustained 606(b) objection	Court: 606(b) properly applied; voir dire information was part of normal proceedings and not an external improper influence; trial court’s denial of new‑trial relief was within discretion
4. Proper definition/application of "beyond a reasonable doubt" on circumstantial evidence; appellant’s proposed "single‑theory" formula	Appellant urges a formal legal formula requiring the State to present a single, directly linked theory for all elements when proof is circumstantial; multiple competing theories trigger reasonable doubt	Existing precedent governs reasonable‑doubt review; courts review rationality of inferences and cumulative circumstantial proof under Jackson standard	Court: declined to adopt appellant’s new formula; relied on established Jackson/Hooper/Clayton standards for reviewing circumstantial evidence (affirmed sufficiency)

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (legal‑sufficiency standard for criminal convictions)
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (remedy when evidence is legally insufficient — judgment of acquittal)
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (circumstantial‑evidence inference vs. speculation rule)
Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (capital vs. felony murder intent distinction)
Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (law of parties and necessity of a parties charge)
Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (test for submitting principals/parties law)
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (affirming convictions based on cumulative circumstantial evidence)