Alma Glisson v. Correctional Medical Services
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3101
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Nicholas Glisson, a seriously ill former laryngeal cancer patient with a permanent stoma and G-tube, entered Indiana DOC custody on Sept. 3, 2010; 37 days later he died of complications including starvation and acute renal failure.
- Corizon (private contractor) provided medical care in the Diagnostic Center and Plainfield Correctional Facility; care was fragmented among many clinicians and lacked any centralized treatment plan or coordination.
- INDOC had preexisting Chronic Disease Intervention Guidelines (HCSD-2.06) requiring coordinated treatment plans; Corizon admitted it did not implement those directives and relied on general standards instead.
- Medical records showed early laboratory signs of malnutrition and renal impairment that went unreviewed or unintegrated across providers; delayed recognition culminated in hospital transfer and discharge shortly before Glisson’s death.
- Alma Glisson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference against Corizon; district court granted summary judgment to defendants; Seventh Circuit reheard en banc.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a private prison medical contractor can be liable under Monell for a policy of inaction (no care-coordination protocol) | Corizon had a deliberate policy not to require coordinated, centralized care for chronic inmates (contrary to INDOC directives), and that policy caused constitutional harm to Glisson | Corizon says absence of written protocols does not amount to deliberate indifference; its providers followed professional standards; no evidence of corporate fault or causation | Reversed district court: plaintiff presented enough evidence that Corizon’s deliberate choice not to implement coordination protocols could be a Monell policy causing Eighth Amendment violation; claim proceeds to trial |
| Whether a single incident (Glisson’s death) suffices to show municipal deliberate indifference absent a pattern of similar incidents | The absence of protocols and INDOC guidance put Corizon on notice that lack of coordination posed obvious risks to chronically ill inmates; prior incidents not required if harm was foreseeable and predictable | Corizon: Monell requires evidence of institutional fault and causation, usually a pattern of prior similar constitutional injuries; single case insufficient here | Majority: single-incident claims can proceed if the policy omission creates an obvious, highly predictable risk of constitutional harm; a jury could so find here. Dissent: disagreed, urging Brown/Harris pattern/culpability requirement and would affirm summary judgment |
| Causation: whether Corizon’s policy choice was the moving force behind constitutional harm | Glisson’s record shows missed opportunities, uncoordinated care, and delayed response to malnutrition and renal failure that Corizon’s systemic choice enabled | Corizon contends individual clinicians’ actions (or inaction) — not a corporate policy — caused harm, and plaintiff lacks proof linking corporate choice to death | Court found disputed material facts about causation appropriate for jury resolution; remanded for trial |
| Standard for corporate liability under § 1983 when policy is omission | Plaintiff: Monell liability applies to private contractors and an affirmative policy of inaction can be a municipal policy under Monell | Defendant: Monell still requires rigorous proof of municipal fault and causation; omission alone is insufficient without pattern or obvious predictability | Court reaffirmed Monell framework but held omission can constitute official policy; requires jury to decide deliberate indifference and causation based on record evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs)
- Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983 requires policy or custom)
- Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (Monell causation standard reaffirmed)
- Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (rigorous culpability and causation requisites for Monell; limited single-incident exception)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (failure-to-train framework; deliberate indifference standard)
- Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs., 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. — Monell liability where systemic failure to enforce suicide-prevention protocols made harm highly predictable)
- Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (private correctional contractors subject to Monell principles)