Allison Leigh Campbell v. State, 01-14-00807-CR

Background

Appellant Allison Leigh Campbell was stopped at a Taco Cabana drive‑thru while asleep in a running, parked car; an off‑duty officer approached, took her Texas driver’s license, and directed her to move the vehicle to a parking spot about 500 feet away.
The officer conceded he did not observe Campbell drive to the location and initially did not smell alcohol; Campbell later was removed from the car, handcuffed, and charged with DWI (she pled guilty after the motion to suppress was denied).
At the suppression hearing the defense argued the officer’s request for and retention of Campbell’s license converted a consensual encounter into an unlawful detention lacking reasonable suspicion.
The defense invoked the “fruits of the poisonous tree” principle: subsequent observations, field sobriety tests, statements, and the officer’s later actions were tainted by the initial illegal detention and should be suppressed.
The State defended the detention as an investigative stop for obstructing a passageway (Tex. Penal Code §42.03) or investigating public intoxication/DWI.
The appellant’s brief distinguishes drive‑thru lanes (expected stop/slow movement) from roadways/highways and argues the facts did not support reasonable suspicion of obstruction, public intoxication, or DWI; the appellant asks the court to set aside the judgment and suppress evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Campbell)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Legality of initial contact/detention	Officer’s approach began as consensual but became a seizure when he demanded, kept her license and ordered her to relocate; no RS to detain	Officer lawfully investigated possible obstruction/public intoxication and could request ID during the stop	Appellant seeks suppression and reversal; the brief requests that the detention be found unlawful — appellate decision not included in this brief
Whether taking and retaining the license converted encounter into detention	Retention of license prevented her leaving and prolonged the encounter, transforming it into a detention without RS	Requesting ID is routine and can be part of a lawful investigative stop	Appellant contends detention was unlawful and tainted subsequent evidence; outcome not decided in this brief
Applicability of obstruction statute (Tex. Penal Code §42.03) to drive‑thru lane	Drive‑thru is expected stop/slow flow; temporary stopping did not render passage unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous; she complied when asked to move	Briefed cases support that brief blocking of a passageway can be criminal; prosecutor argued drive‑thru was a passageway	Appellant argues §42.03 does not apply given facts; appellate ruling not provided here
Whether subsequent evidence is admissible (fruits doctrine)	All observations, FSTs, and statements after the unlawful detention are fruits of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed	State would argue later observations and conduct provided independent grounds for continued detention/arrest	Appellant asks suppression; the brief requests reversal but the court’s holding is not in this document

Key Cases Cited

Brennan v. State, 140 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App. 2004) (appellate court refused to develop undeveloped suppression arguments; discusses requirement to identify suppressed evidence)
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (avoidance of absurd results in statutory interpretation)
Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (scope and duration of Terry stops; warrant checks cannot be used to impermissibly extend detention)
York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (facts supporting public‑intoxication/DWI investigation for a person asleep in a running car)
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (limits on investigative detentions and related analyses)
Lauderback v. State, 789 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App. 1990) (blocking a highway lane can be hazardous and satisfy obstruction)
Morrison v. State, 71 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App. 2002) (distinguishing temporary, nonhazardous stops that do not constitute unlawful obstruction)