Allen Garrett v. Phil Murphy
17 F.4th 419
| 3rd Cir. | 2021Background
- Plaintiff Allen D. Garrett is a federal prisoner and prolific pro se litigant who has repeatedly sued state and federal officials under § 1983 and Bivens.
- In the underlying district-court action Garrett alleged (1) deliberate indifference to COVID-19 risk in pretrial detention (substantive due process) and (2) a speedy-trial violation; he sought immediate release and $100 million.
- The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed the due-process claim without prejudice (leave to amend) and dismissed the speedy-trial claim with prejudice as cognizable only in habeas.
- Garrett filed a premature appeal, then filed a second notice of appeal that was timely; the Third Circuit consolidated the appeals and considered Garrett’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the PLRA three‑strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
- The court examined three prior dismissals of Garrett’s suits that were barred by Heck v. Humphrey and held they count as strikes for failure to state a claim; it also held habeas claims are not PLRA “civil actions” and therefore do not make such dismissals “mixed.”
- Because Garrett had accrued three strikes and failed to show he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury (he had already had COVID-19 and vaccines are available), the court denied IFP and required payment of the filing fee to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissals under Heck v. Humphrey count as §1915(g) strikes | Heck dismissals are not failures to state a claim; Heck is an affirmative defense or jurisdictional | Heck-barred suits lack a cause of action and thus are properly dismissed for failure to state a claim | Dismissals for failure to meet Heck’s favorable-termination requirement count as strikes for failure to state a claim |
| Whether a suit that includes Preiser-style habeas-type claims makes a dismissal "mixed" (and thus not a strike) | Dismissals that also implicate habeas/Preiser claims create a mixed dismissal and should not be counted as a strike | Habeas proceedings are not PLRA "civil actions"; §1983 claims should be treated separately and can yield strikes | Habeas claims are not PLRA civil actions; Preiser-barred claims do not make a Heck dismissal "mixed" and cannot prevent counting a strike |
| Whether a dismissal order must explicitly state strike-counting grounds in the order itself | A dismissal should not count as a strike unless the order explicitly states it was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim | Courts may look to opinions and statutory/rule citations (e.g., §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Rule 12(b)(6)) to determine strike grounds | Courts may examine the opinion and accompanying order; explicit magic words in the order are not required to count a strike |
| Whether Garrett meets the §1915(g) "imminent danger" exception based on COVID-19 risk | Garrett says jail conditions and his health create imminent risk of serious physical injury or death from COVID-19 | Garrett already contracted COVID-19 (natural immunity) and vaccines are widely available; no current imminent risk shown | Garrett failed to demonstrate imminent danger; the §1915(g) exception does not apply and IFP was denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court 1994) (favorable-termination rule: § 1983 damages claims implying invalidity of conviction/sentence are barred until conviction is invalidated)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court 1973) (claims seeking immediate or speedier release are cognizable only in habeas)
- Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013) (strike accrual rules under §1915(g): entire action must be dismissed on strike-counting grounds)
- Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275 (3d Cir. 2021) (mixed-dismissal doctrine: certain mixed dismissals do not count as strikes)
- Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379 (3d Cir. 2021) (Heck’s favorable-termination requirement is not jurisdictional)
- Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996) (PLRA provisions do not apply to habeas petitions)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court 1998) (absence of a valid cause of action is distinct from subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Lomax v. Ortiz‑Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (Supreme Court 2020) (statutory phrases generally have fixed meaning across a statute)