Alice Huff v. Pete Buttigieg, 42 F.4th 638

Background

Alice Robbins Huff, an FAA employee in a safety-sensitive position, self-referred after an off-duty alcohol-related arrest and agreed to an FAA-designed rehabilitation plan.
The plan required AA attendance, random testing, continuing care, case-manager meetings, and FAA preapproval (by telephone) for medications; Huff (a Jehovah’s Witness) objected to AA and sought an accommodation and later filed an EEO complaint.
Ava Wright, the FAA Employee Assistance Program manager, handled Huff’s plan, communicated about medication-approval procedures, and drafted/initiated a noncompliance memorandum after Huff sought medication approval by email.
Human-resources personnel (Murphy), relying on Wright’s noncompliance memo and Department Order 3910.1D, prepared a notice of proposed removal; Huff replied through counsel and was removed in December 2017.
Huff sued claiming retaliation under Title VII (federal-sector provision); the district court granted summary judgment for the FAA, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding disputed facts on causation and cat’s-paw liability required trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Title VII federal-sector §2000e-16 prohibit retaliation and what causation standard applies?	§2000e-16 prohibits retaliation; less-than-but-for causation suffices.	The court should apply private-sector rules (but-for) or incorporate §2000e-3.	§2000e-16 prohibits retaliation; Babb standard applies — retaliation need only "play a part" in the decision.
Did Huff present enough evidence of retaliatory causation to avoid summary judgment?	Evidence of pretext, Wright’s statements/conduct, timing, and ambiguous decisionmaking create triable issues.	The FAA says no causal link; Wright lacked authority and other officials insulated the agency.	A reasonable juror could find retaliatory animus played a part; summary judgment improper.
Can Huff proceed under a cat’s-paw theory where the subordinate (Wright) lacked firing authority?	Wright’s biased reports/memo proximately caused the adverse actions and influenced decisionmakers.	Wright had no firing authority; final decisionmakers independently applied Order 3910.1D.	Cat’s-paw theory can apply; jury could find Wright proximately caused termination through influence.
Was the FAA’s enforcement of the rehabilitation plan pretextual or objectively unreasonable?	FAA applied an ambiguous/rarely enforced rule (requiring phone not email) and imposed disproportionate discipline; inconsistent testimony supports pretext.	FAA contends plan required phone calls and procedures compelled removal under Order 3910.1D.	A jury could find the FAA’s interpretation/enforcement objectively unreasonable and pretextual.

Key Cases Cited

Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) (federal-sector causation: a protected characteristic/retaliation need only play a part in the decision)
Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (federal-sector prohibition on discrimination includes retaliation)
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (employer liable for subordinate’s biased actions that proximately cause adverse action — earlier-agent theory)
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (private-sector retaliation requires but-for causation)
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016) (assumption that federal agencies may not retaliate for EEO complaints)
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (pretext inference where rule enforcement appears unreasonably applied)
Gordon v. United Airlines, 246 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (rare or inconsistently enforced policy enforcement can support pretext)
Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, 195 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1999) (disproportionate discipline relative to offense can show pretext)
Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1996) (misinterpretation of policy may be evidence of pretext)