343 Ga. App. 332
Ga. Ct. App.2017Background
- Plaintiffs are Georgia residents granted DACA (deferred action) who sought a writ of mandamus to compel Board of Regents members to classify them as "lawfully present" and grant in-state tuition under Board rules and OCGA § 20-3-66(d).
- DHS created DACA by memorandum and FAQs stating deferred action does not confer lawful immigration status but that recipients are "considered ... lawfully present" for certain federal admissibility purposes while deferred action is in effect.
- Board policy requires institutions to verify "lawful presence" for resident-tuition determinations but also vests discretion: noncitizen students are not in-state unless legally in the state and the Board determines in-state classification is warranted.
- Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing DHS's DACA designation of "lawful presence" is a federal legal definition that the Board must accept; defendants moved to dismiss, asserting no clear legal duty and official immunity defenses.
- The superior court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the Board to apply the federal definition of "lawful presence" to grant in-state tuition; the Board appealed.
- The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed: it held DACA did not have the force of law sufficient to impose a mandatory duty on the Board, and Board rules confer discretion, so mandamus was inappropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DACA’s designation of recipients as "lawfully present" is federal law that obligates the Board to grant in-state tuition | DACA (and DHS FAQs) define recipients as lawfully present for federal purposes; that federal determination must be applied by the Board | DACA is an agency policy/memo without force of law and does not bind state actors; DHS expressly said DACA confers no immigration status or substantive rights | Court: DACA lacks the procedural/regulatory force required to create a mandatory federal duty; superior court erred to treat it as controlling |
| Whether Board/Georgia law requires the Board to treat DACA recipients as in-state based on federal "lawful presence" labeling | Plaintiffs: state rule requires verification of lawful presence and thus the Board must accept federal determination | Board: OCGA § 20-3-66(d) and Board rules preserve Board discretion; lawful presence verification does not automatically trigger in-state classification | Court: Board rules give broad discretion; even if DACA could be considered for verification, it does not create a ministerial duty to grant in-state tuition |
| Whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy to compel the Board | Plaintiffs: mandamus proper because officials had a clear legal duty to apply federal definition and grant relief | Board: mandamus unavailable where duty is discretionary or federal source does not create a required performance | Court: Mandamus unavailable—plaintiffs failed to show a clear, non-discretionary legal right or duty |
| Whether the superior court should have dismissed the petition | Plaintiffs: complaint stated a claim that could be proved | Board: complaint failed because no enforceable federal duty and state law allows discretion | Court: Dismissal should have been granted; denial was error given plaintiffs’ failure to show required clear duty |
Key Cases Cited
- Benton v. Benton, 280 Ga. 468 (mandamus requires clear legal duty)
- Bland Farms v. Ga. Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Ga. 192 (mandamus issues; authorization insufficient without required performance)
- GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, 299 Ga. 26 (pleading standard; construe pleadings favorably)
- James v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 283 Ga. 517 (state statute must expressly or impliedly impose duty for mandamus)
- Maricopa County Community College Dist. Bd. v. Arizona (Ariz. Ct. App.), 242 Ariz. 325 (agency deferred-action policy does not confer substantive eligibility for state benefits)
- Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (agency immigration policies that bypass rulemaking can be enjoined; notice-and-comment requirement relevant to force of law)
- Doe v. St. Louis Community College, 526 S.W.3d 329 (DACA status does not automatically entitle recipient to in-district tuition)