Alexander Milchtein v. John Chisholm
880 F.3d 895
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- Rabbi Alexander and Ester Milchtein (Orthodox Chabad) have 15 children; two eldest ran away in 2011–2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state proceedings.
- The Milchteins sued in federal court alleging constitutional violations: discrimination or failure to accommodate their Chabad views in the child-welfare/custody proceedings.
- By the time of federal suit, the two eldest were adults and the state-court proceedings concerning them were closed; district court dismissed as moot.
- Milchteins argued the case was not moot because (1) they sought a declaratory judgment about the propriety of Wisconsin’s actions and (2) they have 12 remaining minor children who might trigger similar proceedings.
- District court invoked Rooker–Feldman; the Seventh Circuit held Rooker–Feldman did not bar the suit because plaintiffs did not seek to overturn a state judgment, but found the case nonjusticiable (advisory) and also barred by Younger abstention for future or ongoing state proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness / advisory opinion | Milchteins sought declaratory relief about past state-court conduct; not moot because injury persists and affects remaining children | State argued proceedings concerning the two eldest are closed so any declaration would be advisory and moot | Court: Claim regarding closed proceedings is moot; federal court will not issue advisory opinion about closed state cases |
| Applicability of Rooker–Feldman | Milchteins: federal suit does not ask to alter state judgments, so Rooker–Feldman inapplicable | State: district court treated claims as "inextricably intertwined" and barred by Rooker–Feldman | Court: Rooker–Feldman does not apply because plaintiffs do not seek to overturn state judgments; distinguish from preclusion doctrines |
| "Capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception | Milchteins: future similar proceedings involving other children could recur rapidly so exception saves case from mootness | State: absence of ongoing proceedings and Younger abstention counsel against federal intervention | Court: Even if repetition possible, Younger abstention requires federal courts to abstain from intervening in pending/anticipated state child-welfare proceedings; exception does not authorize present federal adjudication |
| Younger abstention and First Amendment claim | Milchteins: seek federal resolution of constitutional claims (religious accommodation) they fear will recur | State: child-welfare/custody is classic state interest warranting abstention; constitutional defenses should be raised in state court first | Court: Younger requires abstention; plaintiffs do not allege that the mere existence of the state proceeding is itself a First Amendment violation, so abstention stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (U.S. 1923) (federal courts cannot review final state-court judgments)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (U.S. 1983) (limits on federal review of state-court judgments and origins of “inextricably intertwined”)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (distinguishing Rooker–Feldman from preclusion principles)
- Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (U.S. 2011) (clarifying Rooker–Feldman scope)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1971) (federal courts must abstain from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings)
- Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (U.S. 1979) (Younger applied to state-initiated custody proceedings)
- Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (U.S. 1971) (Younger abstention applied to declaratory-judgment requests)
- Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (U.S. 1992) (federal courts generally should leave domestic relations to state courts)
- Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (U.S. 2007) (no priority among reasons for declining to decide merits)
- Remer v. Burlington Area School District, 205 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2000) (example of broad use of “inextricably intertwined” in this circuit)
- Richardson v. The Koch Law Firm, P.C., 768 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2014) (warning against using “inextricably intertwined” to blur Rooker–Feldman boundaries)