Alex Littlejohn v. Ronald Myers
684 F. App'x 563
6th Cir.2017Background
- On May 3, 2014, Littlejohn and another entered a store intending to rob it; Littlejohn had a gun and handed it to his co-defendant before fleeing.
- Officers Myers and Haydruk arrived, observed no weapon, and pursued Littlejohn when he fled through a side door into an alley.
- Myers grabbed Littlejohn by the pants, threw him face-first to the ground, exposed his waist/hips, and performed a quick search finding no weapon.
- While Myers was applying handcuffs (before the second cuff was secured), Littlejohn broke free, pushed off the ground, fled, and did not reach for a weapon, threaten, or strike Myers.
- Myers then shot Littlejohn in the lower back without issuing a warning. Littlejohn sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force), state tort claims, and a Monell claim; Myers appealed denial of qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Myers' use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment | Littlejohn contends shooting him while he ran away and after being searched (no weapon found, no threat) was objectively unreasonable | Myers contends he reasonably believed Littlejohn remained armed and posed a serious threat given the armed-robbery report and flight | Court: Under plaintiff's version, deadly force was unreasonable because Littlejohn did not pose an immediate threat when shot; Fourth Amendment violated |
| Whether Myers had probable cause to believe Littlejohn posed a threat of serious physical harm at the moment of the shooting | Littlejohn argues no probable cause—no weapon observed, no reaching or threatening gestures, no bystanders present | Myers argues circumstances (armed robbery, failure to observe weapon transfer, flight, resistance) justified belief Littlejohn was armed and dangerous | Court: Probable cause to believe an imminent deadly threat was lacking under plaintiff's facts; deadly force not justified |
| Whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time | Littlejohn asserts law clearly forbids shooting a fleeing suspect absent a basis to believe an imminent serious threat existed | Myers argues no clearly established rule applied to these specific facts such that a reasonable officer would know his conduct was unlawful | Court: Right was clearly established—officers may not use deadly force on fleeing suspects who do not pose imminent severe harm; qualified immunity denied |
| Whether this Court should resolve Myers' state-law immunity claim on appeal | Littlejohn: (implicit) district court did not decide state immunity so appellate review is improper | Myers: Ohio statutory immunity should bar state claims and denial is appealable | Court: Declined to decide state-law immunity because district court expressly reserved ruling; appellate jurisdiction over that issue lacking |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (describing qualified immunity framework)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may address either prong of qualified immunity)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force against fleeing felon only when suspect poses significant threat of death or serious harm)
- Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2007) (officer must have basis to believe fleeing suspect poses imminent threat before using deadly force)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (rights must be defined with attention to the specific context for clearly established inquiry)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (defining "clearly established" legal standard)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable)