Alejandro Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., 940 F.3d 354

Alejandro Yeatts was Biomet Argentina’s Business Manager for South America (2008–2014); he communicated with Brazilian distributor Sergio Galindo, who had bribed doctors.
Biomet terminated its distribution relationship with Galindo’s firm after learning of bribery; DOJ investigated Biomet for FCPA violations, leading to a 2012 Deferred Prosecution Agreement requiring an independent monitor.
Biomet suspended Yeatts in April 2014 and terminated him in 2015 amid the company’s internal and DOJ inquiries into Brazil operations.
In October 2014 Biomet circulated a Restricted Parties List (RPL) to employees and partners in Latin America listing Yeatts as included per the ‘Brazil Investigation’ and noting he was ‘suspended in connection with corruption-related investigation involving Biomet Brazil.’
Yeatts sued for defamation (filed 2016), alleging the RPL implied he engaged in criminal or other misconduct; the district court granted summary judgment for Biomet, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Yeatts' Argument	Biomet's Argument	Held
Whether the RPL statement that Yeatts ‘‘poses a significant and unacceptable compliance risk’’ is defamatory	The statement implies objectively verifiable misconduct and is thus a false factual imputation	It is a non-actionable opinion about risk that cannot be proven false	Not defamatory — statement is opinion and not provable false; nonactionable
Whether the RPL statement that Yeatts was ‘‘suspended in connection with [a] corruption-related investigation’’ is defamatory	The suspension’s implication of wrongdoing is defamatory	The statement of suspension is true; truth is a complete defense	Not defamatory — the suspension statement is true and therefore not actionable
Whether malice or privilege saves Yeatts’ claim	Yeatts contends Biomet acted with malice and privileges do not apply	Biomet argued lack of malice and asserted qualified/public-interest privileges	Court did not need to decide privileges or malice because no defamatory imputation; affirmed on non-defamatory grounds

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (distinguishes protected opinion from verifiable factual assertions)
Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998) (statements like ‘very poor lawyer’ are nonactionable opinion)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden and standard)
Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. 2007) (elements of defamation under Indiana law)
Meyer v. Beta Tau House Corp., 31 N.E.3d 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (distinguishing opinion from objectively verifiable fact)
Baker v. Tremco Inc., 917 N.E.2d 650 (Ind. 2009) (definition and harm standard for defamatory communications)
Evans v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 889 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2018) (standard of review for summary judgment)
West v. J. Greg Allen Builder, Inc., 92 N.E.3d 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (truth as a complete defense to defamation)
Wynn v. Chanos, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (company statements about compliance/investment risk can be nonactionable opinion)