Alejandro Velazquez v. City of Long Beach
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12184
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- On Oct. 25, 2009 LBPD Officer Kalid Abuhadwan detained and then arrested Alejandro Velazquez outside his home; Abuhadwan struck Velazquez about eleven times with a baton, causing injuries; Velazquez was never criminally charged.
- Eyewitness accounts conflicted: Abuhadwan testified Velazquez was sarcastic, smelled of alcohol, resisted and pulled away (justifying detention/arrest); Velazquez and other witnesses testified he asked “what’s up,” offered no resistance, and was thrown to the ground and struck without opportunity to comply.
- Velazquez’s BAC later tested at 0.15 at the station; no BAC evidence was known to officers at the time of detention.
- Velazquez sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest and excessive force, asserted Monell municipal-liability theories, and pleaded state tort claims.
- After evidence closed, the district court granted Rule 50(a) JMOL for defendants on the § 1983 unlawful-arrest and Monell claims, excluded evidence of prior complaints/IA history, dismissed state claims without prejudice, and sent excessive-force to the jury, which returned a defense verdict.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed: it held the Rule 50(a) grant on unlawful arrest and Monell claims was erroneous, the exclusion of prior-complaint evidence was an abuse, the state claims were improperly dismissed, and the excessive-force verdict was prejudiced by the JMOL on arrest; remanded for a new trial and ordered reassignment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether reasonable jurors could find no probable cause for arrest under Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1) | Velazquez: evidence shows he did not resist or impede officers; statements like “what’s up” are protected speech and cannot supply probable cause | Officers: Velazquez refused orders, used profanity, pulled away — facts establish probable cause to detain/arrest | Reversed JMOL; a reasonable jury could find no probable cause — arrest question must go to jury |
| Whether the jury’s excessive-force verdict was tainted by the JMOL on unlawful arrest | Velazquez: removing the arrest question and giving instructions treating the arrest as lawful improperly insulated the jury from facts critical to Graham reasonableness | Defendants: JMOL on arrest made excessive-force inquiry unnecessary or proper because probable cause existed | Reversed jury verdict on excessive force; Graham analysis requires considering the facts underlying the arrest, and JMOL prejudiced that inquiry |
| Admissibility and exclusion of officer complaints/internal affairs history (Monell proof) | Velazquez: prior complaints and lack of discipline are relevant to municipal notice/custom and to show a policy of tolerating excessive force | Defendants: such evidence is prejudicial, irrelevant or improper character evidence | Exclusion was abuse of discretion; evidence was relevant to Monell failure-to-discipline theory — JMOL on Monell reversed |
| Dismissal of state-law claims (supplemental jurisdiction) | Velazquez: federal and state claims routinely tried together; nothing warranted declining supplemental jurisdiction | District court: concern about jury confusion instructing on federal/state claims | Reversed dismissal; court abused discretion in blanket refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires a policy/custom causing constitutional violation)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (standard for directed verdicts and weighing evidence on JMOL)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (JMOL standards — must draw inferences for nonmoving party; cannot weigh credibility)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Fourth Amendment excessive-force reasonableness / Graham factors)
- Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372 (verbal criticism of police protected; cannot support § 1983 arrest for resisting)
- Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159 (no § 148 arrest where initial stop/detention lacked reasonable suspicion/probable cause)
- Krechman v. County of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104 (Ninth Circuit precedent on Rule 50 and drawing inferences for nonmoving party)
- Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (Graham application and consideration of facts known to officers in excessive-force analysis)