Alejandro Rodriguez v. Timothy Robbins
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7565
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Appellees represent a certified class of noncitizens detained for more than six months under 8 U.S.C. §§1226(c) or 1225(b) who have not had bond hearings and challenge continued detention.
- District court issued a preliminary injunction requiring bond hearings before an Immigration Judge with potential release, unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that detention is warranted for flight risk or danger.
- Government contends mandatory detention under 1226(c) and 1225(b) has a constitutional and statutory permanent mandate with no time limit.
- The court, applying constitutional avoidance and existing Ninth Circuit precedents, construes the statutes to require a six-month maximum before a bond hearing is required, subject to individualized determinations.
- Hearings and related procedures had begun in November 2012; hundreds of hearings occurred and about two-thirds led to release, indicating practical impact of the injunction.
- Appellees seek to protect fundamental liberty interests by ensuring prompt, neutral review of continued detention.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1226(c) is limited by a six-month time frame requiring a bond hearing | Rodriguez argues for six-month limitation under Casas/Tijani | Robbins contends §1226(c) is mandatory detention with no time limit | Yes; six-month period with bond hearing required when detention becomes prolonged |
| Whether §1225(b) must be construed to avoid constitutional concerns | Rodriguez seeks six-month implicit time limit for 1225(b) detainees | Robbins argues for plain mandatory detention until removal proceedings conclude | Yes; §1225(b) read to be implicitly time-limited, shifting to §1226(a) after six months |
| Whether bond hearings must be before a neutral judge with clear and convincing evidence standard | Singh requires neutral IJ and clear and convincing burden | Government asserts existing parole framework is sufficient and hearings are not required | Yes; bond hearings before a neutral judge with clear and convincing evidence are required |
| Whether prolonged detention raises irreparable harm and public-interest considerations | Detention beyond six months causes irreparable harm and is detrimental to public interest | Detention is a lawful exercise of authority and in the public interest to enforce removal | Yes; irreparable harm established and public interest supported by ensuring constitutional compliance |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction | Injunction appropriately narrows enforcement to avoid constitutional concerns | Injunction excessively interferes with statutory mandates | No; injunction properly tailored to ensure constitutional compliance and uniform application |
Key Cases Cited
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (upheld mandatory detention during removal proceedings but with noted limits on duration)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (U.S. 2001) (indefinite detention constitutional concerns; supports reasonable-time limits)
- Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008) (detention beyond brief periods requires neutral forum to contest necessity of detention; time-limited view of §1226(c))
- Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) (limits on prolonged detention under §1226(c); supports time-limited interpretation)
- Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II), 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) (extended Casas reasoning to §1231(a)(6); prolonged detention at six months trigger bond hearing)
- Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011) (burden of proof at Casas hearings; contemporaneous record required)
- Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (U.S. 1953) (entry-exclusion context; limited due process protections for arriving aliens)
- Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (Mezei-based reasoning on entry-detention; pre-IIRIRA framework)
- Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (U.S. 1982) (returning permanent residents entitled to due process; Mezei applicability limited)
