148 A.3d 284
Me.2016Background
- Alec T. and Emma L. Sabina sued JPMorgan Chase after Chase recorded a mortgage release on their Portland property and mailed the Sabinas a copy but retained the recorded instrument returned from the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds.
- Sabinas alleged Chase violated 33 M.R.S. § 551 by failing to mail the recorded release (i.e., the document received from the registry) rather than a copy.
- Chase moved to dismiss under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); the trial court granted the motion, reasoning the statute was ambiguous and mailing a copy accomplished the statute’s purpose.
- On appeal, the Maine Law Court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and treated the complaint’s factual allegations as admitted.
- The Court held § 551’s plain language unambiguously requires mailing “the release” the mortgagee receives from the registry (not a copy), vacated the dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 551 requires mailing the recorded instrument received from the registry (the release itself) or permits mailing a copy | Sabinas: statute requires mailing the recorded release the mortgagee receives; mailing only a copy violates § 551 | Chase: mailing a copy satisfies the statute; the statute is ambiguous and should be construed to permit mailing a copy | Court: § 551 is unambiguous; use of "the recorded release" requires mailing the same document received from the registry (not a copy); dismissal vacated |
| Whether omission of the word "original" renders the statute ambiguous | Sabinas: the phrase "the release" means the recorded release returned by the registry and is unambiguous | Chase: omission of "original" creates ambiguity, especially with electronic recording practices | Court: omission does not create ambiguity; the definite article "the" shows intent to require mailing the recorded release the mortgagee receives; electronic recording does not alter the requirement as written |
| Whether statutory penal/remedial characterization affects construction (i.e., strict construction for penal statutes) | Sabinas: statutory language controls regardless of characterization | Chase: if penal, ambiguities should be construed strictly in defendant’s favor permitting copies | Court: because statute is unambiguous, court did not apply strict construction rule and did not decide penal/remedial label |
Key Cases Cited
- Andrews v. Sheepscot Island Co., 138 A.3d 1197 (Me. 2016) (treat complaint facts as admitted when reviewing 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Nadeau v. Frydrych, 108 A.3d 1254 (Me. 2014) (legal sufficiency review on Rule 12(b)(6))
- Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc., 956 A.2d 110 (Me. 2008) (statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- MaineToday Media, Inc. v. State, 82 A.3d 104 (Me. 2013) (interpret statutes according to unambiguous meaning absent absurd result)
- Strout v. Central Me. Med. Ctr., 94 A.3d 786 (Me. 2014) (look to plain language first, then legislative history if ambiguous)
- Lydon v. Sprinkler Servs., 841 A.2d 793 (Me. 2004) (definite vs. indefinite article can indicate legislative intent)
- Wong v. Hawk, 55 A.3d 425 (Me. 2012) (words in a statute must be given meaning and not treated as superfluous)
- Currier v. Huron, 940 A.2d 1085 (Me. 2008) (purpose of § 551 is to ensure timely discharges)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (U.S. 1982) (vagueness doctrine principles)