[¶ 1] The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court (Portland, Eggert, J.) modifying a child support order of the Family Law Magistrate (Najarian, M.). DHHS asserts that (A) the District Court erred in crediting toward Jack Hawk’s support obligation the dependent benefit his daughter receives based on his Social Security retirement account, and (B) the magistrate did not abuse her discretion in declining to deviate from the child support guidelines. We agree, vacate the District Court’s judgment, and remand with instructions to reinstate the magistrate’s modification order.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Jack Hawk and Myndilee Wong divorced in 2002, and Wong received primary custody of their only child, a daughter who turned seven that year. The initial child support order required that Hawk pay $165.33 per week in child support. In 2008, the District Court (Cantara, J.) increased Hawk’s support obligation to $187.95 per week, based on an imputed annual income of $80,000 for Hawk, $25,000 income for Wong, and Hawk’s provision of health insurance for his daughter.
[¶ 3] In July 2011, DHHS filed a motion to modify Hawk’s child support obligation, based on an alleged decline in his annual income from $80,000 to $38,344. The magistrate held a hearing on the mo
[¶ 4] The magistrate also found that the daughter suffers from mental illness and spends most days in a residential facility. As a result, each week, Wong attends at least four multi-hour meetings related to her daughter’s treatment. The daughter has, since May 2010, received $1001 in monthly Social Security dependent benefits based on Hawk’s Social Security retirement account. Thе magistrate found that Hawk voluntarily retired and reduced his income, not because he was unable to work, but to provide his daughter with the dependent benefit. The magistrate based this finding on Hawk’s own admission, and the attachment to Hawk’s child support affidavit stated, “I am a 65 year old diabеtic who due to [the] down turn in our area’s building [industry] retired early so my daughter could receive benefits which I hoped would help [Wong] in [the child’s] care.”
[¶ 5] Applying the child support guidelines to these findings, the magistrate concluded that Hawk’s child support obligation was $152.32 per week. The magistrаte considered deviation from the guidelines pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2007 (2011) based on the daughter’s receipt of the dependent benefit. However, the magistrate ultimately concluded that application of the guidelines without deviation for the dependent benefit was “just and equitable” based on Hawk’s voluntary retirement and the child’s special needs, which affected Wong’s ability to maintain full-time employment. The magistrate did not consider whether, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2107 (2011), Hawk should receive a credit toward his child support obligations based on his daughter’s receipt of the dеpendent benefit. Hawk did not move for additional findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).
[¶ 6] Following the modification order, Hawk filed an objection in the District Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 118(a), requesting, among other things, that the court credit the child’s dependent benefit toward his child support obligation. The court (Eggert, J.) modified the magistrate’s order without a hearing. Based on the magistrate’s factual findings as to the amount of the dependent benefit and the weekly child support obligation, the court concluded that 19-A M.R.S. § 2107 provided Hawk with a child support credit in an amount еqual to the child’s dependent benefit. The court recognized that the plain language of section 2107 provides the credit only for benefits received as a result of the obligor’s disability, but concluded that even if section 2107 did not apply to retirement account benefits, a deviation from the child support guidelines based on the child’s receipt of the dependent benefit was appropriate pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2007.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶ 7] DHHS raises two issues on appeal. First, DHHS argues that the District Court erred as a matter of law in granting Hawk a credit toward his child support obligation for the child’s receipt of the dependent benefit, because 19-A M.R.S. § 2107 authorizes a credit only for benefits derived from a parent’s disability and not from a parent’s retirement. Sec
A. The Dependent Benefit Credit Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2107
[¶ 8] Whether the District Court erred in concluding that 19-A M.R.S. § 2107 permits a credit toward child support obligations for retirement account benefits is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See Liberty Ins: Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner,
[¶ 9] In relevant part, 19-A M.R.S. § 2107 provides that after calculating a parent’s child support obligation, a court must apply a credit toward that obligation “[i]f a child receives dependent benefits as a result of the obligor parent’s disability.” To grant the credit, the tribunal “shall” find that “the child currently receives dependent benefits as a result of the obligor parent’s disability.” Id. § 2107(2)(A). Section 2107 does riot define what constitutеs a disability, and the provision does not expressly provide a credit for dependent benefits as a result of a parent’s retirement. Thus, we must determine whether, as the District Court concluded, a parent’s retirement is sufficiently equivalent to a disability to fall within the child support crеdit authorized by section 2107.
[¶ 10] We have previously recognized, albeit in a different context, that “retirement benefits do not fill the same role as disability benefits, but represent a form of entitlement deriving from the employee’s years of work.... [Retirement benefits] may be elected voluntarily, and have nothing to do with disability.” Dishon v. Me. State Ret. Sys.,
[¶ 12] In Hawk’s сase, the dependent benefit his daughter receives is based on his Social Security retirement account, not on a disability resulting from an injury that impaired his earning capacity. Hawk retired due to a downturn in the building industry and to provide the dependent benefit for his daughter. Reading section 2107 to apply to retirement accounts would render superfluous section 2107’s reference to dependent benefits based on a disability. See Blue Yonder, LLC,
B. Deviation from the Child Support Guidelines Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2007
[¶ 13] DHHS also contends that the District Court erred in summarily reversing the magistrate’s decision not to grant a deviation from the child support guidelines because the magistrate acted within the bounds of her discretion when she declined tо deviate. Before addressing the merits of this argument, we first identify the proper standard of review.
[¶ 14] When the District Court modifies a family law magistrate’s decision in part and adopts that decision in part pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 118 (a)(2), we review both the magistrate’s decision and the District Court’s order. See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Pelletier,
[¶ 15] Here, the District Court acted in an appellate capacity when it reversed the magistrate’s decision not to deviate pursuant to section 2007. The court’s decision that a deviation was justified, even if the section 2107 credit did not apply, was not an additional legal conclusion but rather a summary reversal of the magistrate’s exercise of discretion in the deviation determination. Accordingly, we directly review the magistrate’s factual findings for clear error, and the magistrate’s child support order for an abuse of discretion. See Pratt,
[¶ 16] Turning to clear error review of the magistrate’s factual findings, the findings are consistent with the parties’ testimony and the evidence. Hawk admitted that he retired due to the downturn in the building industry and to obtain dependent benefits for his daughter. As for Hawk’s contention that the magistrate
[¶ 17] Next, we consider the magistrate’s decision not to deviate from the child support guidelines for an abuse of discretion. See Monty,
[¶ 18] Hawk did not present proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at any time before expiration of the ten-day M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) time period following the hearing before the magistrate. By the plain language of section 2007(2), which states that a party “shall” present such findings in order to obtain deviation, Hawk failed to adequately suppоrt his request for deviation, and therefore we presume that the magistrate acted within her discretion in declining to deviate. See id. Moreover, the magistrate did not violate any positive law in declining to deviate, because section 2007 makes deviation a matter of judicial discretion, and the magistrate found Hawk’s request unpersuasive based on permissible statutory criteria.
The entry is:
Judgment of the District Court is vacated. Remanded with instructions to reinstate the magistrate’s order.
Notes
. Title 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 1095 and 1122 have since been repealed. P.L.1985, ch. 801, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 1987).
. See also Black's Law Dictionary 528-29 (9th ed.2009) (defining "disability” as "[a]n objectively measurable condition of impairment, physical or mental," and "disability benefits” as "[pjayments from public or private funds to a disabled person who cannot work, such as social-security or workers’-compensation benefits”); 4 Larson’s Workers' Compensation Law § 80.02 (2012) (noting that in the workers’ compensation context, a disability requires two elements: a disability in the
. Although the parties did not provide us with a record explaining the daughter’s physical and mental condition or Wong’s time commitment in caring for her daughter, we assume that if a transcript or an audio file of the hearing were included in the record on appeal, it would support the magistrate’s findings. See State v. Hughes,
. These criteria include consideration of the child’s financial resources, the child’s physical and emotional condition and educational needs, eаch party’s financial resources and needs, and the available income and financial contributions of each spouse's current partner. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2007(3)(D), (E), (G), (H), (J) (2011). Applying these criteria to the facts, Wong’s time commitment in caring for the child, which in turn limited her employment opportunities, suрported the decision not to deviate. See Daigle v. Daigle,