664 S.W.3d 807
Tex.2023Background
- Fortenberry signed a three-year NFL contract with the Dallas Cowboys in May 2015 and trained with the team in Dallas County in the months before August 2015.
- He stayed at the Residence Inn (a Marriott hotel) in Irving, Dallas County, while attending team practices and conditioning; the Cowboys provided the accommodations.
- On August 2, 2015, Fortenberry suffered a knee injury at the Cowboys’ training camp in Oxnard, California.
- His workers’ compensation claim was denied; the parties litigated administratively at the Texas DWC Dallas Field Office and stipulated that venue there was proper (the DWC found venue proper).
- After administrative appeals, Fortenberry sued for judicial review in Dallas County under Tex. Lab. Code § 410.252(b), alleging he resided in Dallas County at the time of injury; the trial court denied Great Divide’s transfer motion, and a jury returned a verdict for Fortenberry.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding a hotel stay could not establish residence and remanding for further venue proceedings; the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held there was probative evidence Fortenberry resided in Dallas County, making venue mandatory there.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fortenberry) | Defendant's Argument (Great Divide) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Labor Code § 410.252(b) mandated venue in Dallas County (did employee "reside" there at injury) | Fortenberry lived and resided at the Irving hotel and trained/received treatment in Dallas County before injury, so § 410.252(b) requires suit in Dallas County | He did not reside in any Texas county at the time of injury; intermittent hotel stays do not establish residence, so § 410.252(b) doesn’t apply | Court held there was probative evidence he resided in Dallas County and § 410.252(b) mandated venue there |
| Can a hotel stay constitute a "residence" for venue purposes? | Yes; temporary or intermittent stays can constitute residence depending on facts (possession, intent, duration) | No; hotel guests are mere licensees and cannot establish the requisite possession or residence | Court rejected a categorical bar on hotel stays; a hotel can be a residence depending on circumstances |
| Effect of administrative stipulation that venue was proper at the Dallas Field Office | The stipulation (and ALJ finding) that claimant lived within 75 miles of the Dallas Field Office is binding and supports Dallas venue | The stipulation does not prove county of residence; other counties could be within 75 miles | Court treated the stipulation as final, binding, and probative evidence supporting Dallas County residence |
| Whether the court of appeals properly remanded for further venue proceedings | N/A (Fortenberry argued appeal was wrongly decided) | Argued trial court erred in denying transfer; court of appeals found no probative evidence for any proper venue | Court held the court of appeals erred: on plenary review there was probative evidence of Dallas residence and remand was improper; reversed and remanded for consideration of other unresolved issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Snyder v. Pitts, 241 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1951) (adopts flexible test for residence; intermittent hotel/rented-room stays can establish venue)
- Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993) (appellate review of venue considers entire record and defers to trial court if any probative evidence supports venue)
- Warehouse Partners v. Gardner, 910 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995) (interprets "permanent residence" under Property Code; distinguished here as inapposite)
- Wilson v. Bridgeman, 24 Tex. 615 (Tex. 1860) (short stays may suffice for venue depending on circumstances)
- Howell v. Mauzy, 899 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994) (when a party is in the process of moving, residence may be uncertain and lie in either county)
- Dixon v. McDonald, 130 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1939) (short stays may be insufficient where there is clear intent not to remain)