Alboniga v. School Board of Broward County Florida
87 F. Supp. 3d 1319
S.D. Fla.2015Background
- A.M., a six‑year‑old Broward County public school student, has cerebral palsy, is non‑verbal, wheelchair‑dependent, and uses a seizure alert/response service dog (Stevie) trained to perform seizure‑related tasks.
- Plaintiff Monica Alboniga procured and trained Stevie; Stevie normally is tethered to A.M. and alerts before seizures and performs a protective “cover” task during episodes.
- Broward School Board drafted and then implemented service‑animal policies (finalized Aug. 2014) that required additional vaccinations and liability insurance, and stated parents must provide a handler when a child cannot supervise the animal; administrative staff followed drafts earlier.
- Plaintiff requested accommodation to allow Stevie at school (July 2013); School Board initially demanded extra vaccinations, liability insurance, and a handler; later the Board provided a school employee (custodian) as a handler who walks Stevie on leash (not tethered) and takes him outside to urinate.
- Plaintiff sued under Title II of the ADA and Section 504, seeking (among other relief) an order barring the Board from imposing extra insurance/vaccination requirements and requiring assistance so A.M. may have Stevie tethered to him at school and be accompanied outside to urinate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction / IDEA exhaustion | ADA/§504 claims are not IDEA‑based because plaintiff does not challenge the IEP or allege denial of FAPE; exhaustion not required | Plaintiff failed to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies; Court lacks jurisdiction | Court: Exhaustion not required because claims are independent of IDEA and do not seek relief available under IDEA; federal jurisdiction exists |
| Mootness | Temporary allowance of dog does not moot claims because Board’s allowance contradicts its policies and voluntary cessation exception applies | Board permits A.M. and Stevie at school, so no live controversy | Court: Not moot; Board’s ad hoc practice could revert and voluntary cessation standard not satisfied |
| Validity of DOJ Title II service‑animal regs (28 C.F.R. §35.136) | DOJ regs are a permissible, specific application of Title II reasonable‑modification obligation | Board contends DOJ exceeded authority and §35.136 conflicts with §35.130(b)(7) | Court: Regulations are a permissible construction entitled to Chevron deference and are consistent with §35.130(b)(7); enforceable against Board |
| Reasonable accommodation — handler, control, care, insurance/vaccines | Requests: allow Stevie tethered to A.M. (A.M. as handler), Board staff assist A.M. to take Stevie outside to urinate; bar extra insurance and excess vaccination requirements | Board says it cannot be required to act as handler or supervise/ care for the animal; parent must provide handler and meet policy conditions (insurance, vaccines) | Court: Board may not impose surcharge‑style insurance or exceed‑Florida‑law vaccine requirements; permitting tethering to A.M. meets §35.136(d) control; limited assistance by staff to accompany A.M./Stevie outside to urinate is a reasonable accommodation and does not constitute prohibited "care or supervision" under §35.136(e) |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (agency interpretations entitled to deference)
- Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003) (DOJ Title II regulations receive deference)
- Bircoll v. Miami‑Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 2007) (elements of a Title II ADA claim)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (mootness and voluntary cessation principles)
- Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (ADA’s broad remedial purpose regarding integration and participation)
- Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (service animals and meaningful access under Title II)