ALBERT WITTIK VS. DEBRA WITTIK (FM-18-0426-12, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-0333-17T1
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Dec 3, 2018Background
- Albert Wittik and Debra Wittik divorced; Wittik had earlier transferred a 50% interest in a Branchburg (Cheyenne Trail) property to his daughter, Angela Suske, as tenant in common. Suske paid nothing and claimed she learned of the interest only when served with a third-party complaint.
- Debra sued for equitable distribution; during protracted discovery disputes she obtained a default-based hearing on her counterclaim and sought half the value of jointly held assets, including 50% of the Cheyenne Trail property.
- A default hearing was held (May 1–2, 2017) after prior scheduling events; Suske was not notified by the court of the hearing dates, received only an "on-call" subpoena from defendant’s counsel, did not appear, and her deposition was not introduced at the hearing.
- The trial judge awarded Debra $500,000 in equitable distribution, appointed a trustee to collect assets, and authorized the trustee to deed the Cheyenne Trail property to Debra if the monetary award was not satisfied — effectively adjudicating Suske’s ownership interest.
- Post-judgment, Suske and Wittik argued they lacked notice and were deprived of due process; the trial court denied relief, finding Suske had constructive notice (proposed judgment notice and on-call subpoena) and treated deposition material in ruling.
- The Appellate Division reversed, holding the adjudication of Suske’s property interest at the default hearing violated due process because she lacked adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard; the matter was remanded for a hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether adjudicating and transferring a third party’s property interest at a default hearing without specific notice violates due process | Wittik/plaintiff argued third-party interests were adjudicated without adequate notice to the third-party defendants, violating their right to notice and hearing | Debra/defendant argued third-party defendants had notice via the 2016 notice of proposed judgment and the on-call subpoena, and their lack of participation amounted to waiver | Held: Due process violated — notice provided was not reasonably calculated to apprise Suske that the default hearing would adjudicate her ownership; remand for a hearing. |
| Whether the trial court properly considered Suske’s deposition (not introduced at the default hearing) in ruling on reconsideration | Wittik argued the deposition was not part of the default hearing record and could not be used to adjudicate third-party rights | Debra relied on the deposition to support that Suske had knowledge and that the result was correct | Held: Appellate court did not decide this issue (unnecessary to resolve after reversing for lack of due process). |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (U.S. 1950) (notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties and permit them to present objections)
- Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1978) (purpose of notice is to apprise affected individuals and permit adequate preparation for a hearing)
- Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (N.J. 1995) (due process requires opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner)