140 F.4th 300
6th Cir.2025Background
- Cleveland Water, a city department, placed water liens on properties with unpaid water bills (over $300, 180+ days delinquent), disproportionately affecting Black homeowners in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
- Between 2012 and 2020, most water liens were assessed in majority Black neighborhoods despite Black residents forming a minority of the county’s population.
- Plaintiffs, all African American, alleged that this policy violates the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Ohio Civil Rights Act (OCRA), and the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions through disparate impact.
- Plaintiffs moved for certification of a class action for injunctive and monetary relief on behalf of all similarly situated Black homeowners or residents affected by water liens in the prior two years.
- The district court certified the Water Lien Class under Federal Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3); the City of Cleveland appealed, challenging predominance and standing.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class, focusing on class action prerequisites and the sufficiency of classwide injury under the FHA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rule 23(a) prerequisites for class action | Numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy all met; class policies impact all members similarly | No substantial challenge on appeal | Prerequisites satisfied, no abuse of discretion |
| Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class | The injunctive/declaratory relief is appropriate for the whole class; policy can be enjoined classwide | (Minimal challenge; argued about forfeiture of challenge, not merits) | Class properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2) |
| Rule 23(b)(3) predominance | Common questions (disproportionate impact under FHA/OCRA) predominate; damages can be sorted later | Predominance fails—each class member needs individualized proof of economic harm | Common liability issues predominate; damages variation doesn’t defeat certification |
| Article III standing (injury in fact) | FHA claim itself suffices for standing; injury is comparable to traditional recognized harms | Up to 20% of class lacks economic injury; standing requires concrete, personal harm (post-TransUnion) | Standing satisfied; statutory FHA harm recognized as sufficient, even absent economic damages |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2011) (sets out standards for class certification, especially under Rule 23(b)(2))
- Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1997) (discusses Rule 23 requirements and protection of absent class members)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442 (U.S. 2016) (permissibility of aggregate class damages without identical harm)
- Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (U.S. 2015) (recognizes disparate impact claims under FHA)
- Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (U.S. 1974) (merits should not be considered at class certification stage)
- Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015) (common injury theory suffices for class certification)
- Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2012) (standard for reviewing class certification for abuse of discretion)
