Albert Korb v. Haystings, 19-2826

Korb, an inmate at SCI‑Albion, alleges Sgt. Haystings assaulted him after summoning him to an office.
Korb filed a pro se § 1983 complaint initially naming Haystings and soon amended to add Secretary John Wetzel and Superintendent Mike Clark; the complaint stated he had not completed the prison grievance process but Korb later submitted letters showing he completed exhaustion.
The District Court granted IFP, docketed the complaint, but later dismissed the action with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust and for lack of personal‑involvement allegations as to Wetzel and Clark, and denied leave to amend as futile.
Korb filed declarations asserting he exhausted; the District Court treated them as motions to reconsider and denied relief.
On appeal, the Third Circuit held the District Court should have treated Korb’s pre‑motion‑to‑dismiss letters as Rule 15(d) supplements (per Garrett) showing exhaustion and therefore dismissal with prejudice was improper.
The Third Circuit also held the court erred by denying leave to amend claims against Wetzel and Clark as futile, because the exhaustion defect was cured by the supplements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal with prejudice was proper where plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies after filing but before defendants moved to dismiss	Korb argued his subsequent filings showed he completed the grievance process and should be treated as supplements curing exhaustion	Defendants relied on the original complaint admission that exhaustion was incomplete to justify dismissal	Dismissal with prejudice was improper; courts should treat pro se post‑filing exhaustion filings as Rule 15(d) supplemental pleadings and consider them when evaluating PLRA exhaustion
Whether claims against supervisory defendants (Wetzel, Clark) should be dismissed and whether leave to amend must be permitted	Korb argued he should be allowed to amend to allege supervisory involvement	Defendants argued lack of specific allegations and that amendment would be futile because of unexhausted claims	District Court erred to deny leave to amend as futile; on remand Korb should be allowed to attempt curative amendment once exhaustion is treated as satisfied

Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rule 15(d) supplements may cure PLRA exhaustion defects and be treated as part of the original complaint)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (exhaustion under the PLRA is an affirmative defense, not a pleading requirement)
Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2000) (unexhausted PLRA claims should be dismissed without prejudice)
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004) (district courts must allow curative amendments unless futile or inequitable)
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2005) (supervisory liability requires personal involvement shown by direction or knowledge and acquiescence)
Downey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 968 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2020) (supplemental complaints filed post‑exhaustion can relate back to cure initial exhaustion failures)
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (supplemental pleadings may cure jurisdictional defects)
T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, 913 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rule 15(d) supplements can cure non‑jurisdictional defects)