Albert E. Brinson v. Pat Welsh
709 F. App'x 582
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Albert and Dawn Brinson were cited under City of Tybee Island ordinances for "Dog on the Beach" while launching their sailboat from a private boat ramp.
- Proceeding pro se, they sued the City and three employees alleging discrimination and harassment under multiple constitutional provisions and federal statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986).
- The magistrate judge sua sponte found the original complaint deficient, ordered amendment, and the Brinsons filed a response treated as an amended complaint.
- The amended pleading chiefly alleged discriminatory enforcement: Tybee allowed some residents to bring dogs or litter without citation while citing the Brinsons as non-residents.
- The magistrate recommended dismissal with prejudice as further amendment would be futile; the district court adopted the R&R and dismissed. Albert Brinson appealed; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by sua sponte dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim | Brinsons argued the citation was discriminatory and harassing and that the magistrate’s amendment order was collusive; alleged selective enforcement against non-residents | Tybee Island argued the complaint lacked factual allegations plausibly showing discrimination or liability and dismissal was proper | No abuse of discretion: dismissal appropriate because amended complaint lacked factual matter showing plausible liability; amendment would be futile |
| Whether the alleged facts supported a plausible selective-enforcement/discrimination claim | Brinsons pointed to alleged instances where Tybee residents were not cited for similar conduct | Defendants noted unspecific, conclusory assertions without factual particulars (who, when, comparable conduct) | Held insufficient; allegations only raised a mere possibility of misconduct and were legal conclusions, not factual plausibility |
| Whether pro se status required the court to rewrite or supply facts to sustain claims | Brinsons relied on liberal construction of pro se pleadings to preserve claims | Defendants maintained courts need not act as de facto counsel or convert conclusions into facts | Court affirmed that pro se pleadings are construed liberally but cannot be rewritten; plaintiffs must plead plausible facts |
| Whether the magistrate’s prior notice and opportunity to amend cured any procedural issues with sua sponte dismissal | Brinsons contended dismissal was improper or collusive | Defendants emphasized magistrate gave notice and chance to amend but amended pleading still failed to state a claim | Court held notice and opportunity were given and dismissal was not an abuse of discretion because amendment would have been futile |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim)
- Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1997) (standard of review for dismissal for failure to state a claim)
- Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (sua sponte dismissal reviewed for abuse of discretion; notice and opportunity to amend required unless futile)
- Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2015) (amendment futile and patently frivolous exceptions to notice requirement)
- Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014) (courts will not rewrite deficient pro se pleadings or act as de facto counsel)
