Alaska Airlines v. Judy Schurke
898 F.3d 904
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Flight attendant Laura Masserant (Alaska Airlines employee) requested to use two of seven accrued vacation days in May 2011 to care for a sick child; the Airline denied the request because those vacation days were prescheduled under the CBA for later in the year.
- The Washington Family Care Act (WFCA), Wash. Rev. Code § 49.12.270(1), allows employees to use accrued sick leave or other paid leave to care for family members and requires compliance with CBA terms except for terms "relating to the choice of leave."
- Masserant filed a complaint with Washington Department of Labor & Industries (L&I); L&I concluded the Airline violated the WFCA and issued a notice of infraction and a $200 penalty.
- Alaska Airlines sued L&I in federal court seeking injunctions on grounds that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) preempts Masserant’s WFCA claim because the right to the leave derives from the CBA and any dispute must be resolved through the RLA grievance/arbitration process.
- The district court denied the Airline’s motion, holding Masserant’s WFCA claim invokes an independent state-law right and can be resolved without interpreting the CBA; the Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Masserant/L&I) | Defendant's Argument (Alaska Airlines) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RLA preempts a WFCA claim that seeks to use accrued vacation time scheduled under a CBA for family medical leave | WFCA creates an independent, nonnegotiable state-law right to choose which accrued leave to use for family care; that right applies whether leave is governed by a CBA or employer policy | The right to take paid leave exists solely by virtue of the CBA; disputes about entitlement or rescheduling are "minor disputes" under the RLA and must go to grievance/arbitration | Not preempted: the WFCA claim does not arise entirely from the CBA and can be resolved without interpreting CBA terms; RLA preemption therefore does not apply |
| Whether reference to undisputed CBA terms (e.g., that vacation days exist and are prescheduled) requires RLA preemption | Citing undisputed CBA facts does not convert an independent state-law claim into a CBA dispute | Any claim that depends on CBA-created entitlement or usage is preempted even if the CBA terms are undisputed | Held for plaintiff: mere reference to or application of undisputed CBA terms is insufficient to trigger RLA preemption |
| Proper scope of RLA/§301 preemption analysis (forum v. substantive preemption) | Courts may and must interpret the state-law cause of action to determine its legal character for preemption analysis (i.e., ask whether state law claim depends on CBA interpretation) | The preemption inquiry should not permit courts to construe state law; instead, the court should accept the plaintiff’s pleaded characterization and confine inquiry to whether the complaint on its face raises a minor dispute | The majority: preemption analysis assesses whether the claim, as pleaded, requires CBA interpretation; but courts may examine whether the state-law right is independent and whether resolution would require construing the CBA. The en banc majority rejects a rule that would allow defendants to short-circuit state proceedings by federal injunctions |
| Remedy/scope if some CBA interpretation were required | State-law claim would survive to the extent it can be adjudicated without CBA interpretation; any necessary CBA interpretation must be resolved by grievance/arbitration and preemption would be limited to that degree | Defendant seeks broad federal relief to enjoin state agency enforcement entirely | Court: preemption is limited and protective of arbitration’s role; if interpretation of CBA is necessary only to a limited degree, remedy should be tailored (e.g., enjoin state agency from construing CBA terms) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994) (RLA preemption extends only as necessary to protect the role of grievance and arbitration in CBA disputes)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (§301 preemption limited to claims that require interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (a state-law claim is not preempted merely because it refers to or relies on the CBA unless its resolution requires interpretation of the CBA)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (preemption doctrine protects the arbitrator’s primary role in interpreting CBAs and prevents recharacterization of CBA disputes as state-law claims)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (state claims that are grounded in rights created by collective-bargaining agreements are preempted; pleading artifice cannot evade preemption)
- Conrail v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) (distinguishing major and minor disputes under the RLA; minor disputes concern interpretation/application of CBAs)
- United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (collective bargaining agreements create a system of industrial self-governance and grievance/arbitration is integral)
- Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (applies two-step test for §301/RLA preemption; agency interpretations cannot override plain statutory/regulatory language)
- Matson v. United Parcel Serv., 840 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2016) (restates two-part inquiry for preemption: whether claim is grounded in CBA and whether resolution requires interpreting the CBA)