Alan Nelson Crotts v. Jessalyn Elizabeth Cole
480 S.W.3d 99
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Alan Crotts sued Jessalyn Cole alleging she was his wife and asserting money-damage claims; Cole moved to dismiss under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.
- The trial court granted Cole’s Rule 91a motion and entered a final dismissal on October 14, 2013.
- Within 30 days Crotts filed a written “Motion to Reinstate” and a “First Amended Motion to Reinstate and Motion to Quash,” seeking reinstatement (citing Rule 165a(3)) and asking the court to "quash" the Rule 91a dismissal; Crotts did not attend the original hearing but opposed the Rule 91a motion in writing.
- The trial court signed a December 6, 2013 Reinstatement Order restoring two causes of action (defamation and breach of contract) to the docket.
- Cole moved to declare the Reinstatement Order void and to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground the trial court’s plenary power had expired; on January 27, 2014 the court vacated the Reinstatement Order and dismissed the action. Crotts appealed two days later.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether this court has jurisdiction (timeliness of appeal) | Crotts: his amended motion substantively sought modification and thus extended plenary power; appeal timely. | Cole: plenary power expired Nov 13, 2013; Crotts’s postjudgment filings did not extend deadlines, so appeal is untimely. | Court held Crotts timely appealed; appellate jurisdiction exists. |
| Whether the trial court had plenary power to enter the Reinstatement Order | Crotts: his amended motion was a timely motion to modify that extended plenary power under Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(g). | Cole: motions were unverified and Rule 165a context (want-of-prosecution cases) governs, so plenary power expired. | Court held the amended motion extended plenary power and the trial court had authority to enter the Reinstatement Order. |
| Whether Rule 91a dismissal is exempt from Rule 329b timetables (i.e., whether Rule 91a dismissals lose plenary power earlier) | Crotts: Rule 91a dismissals remain subject to Rule 329b; postjudgment motions that seek substantive change can extend plenary power. | Cole: analogizes to venue-transfer cases and to want-of-prosecution precedents to argue plenary power cannot be extended. | Court rejected Cole’s extension of those lines; held Rule 91a dismissals are subject to Rule 329b and may be modified by timely substantive postjudgment motions. |
| Whether the January 27, 2014 order vacating the Reinstatement Order and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction was proper | Crotts: the court erred — it had jurisdiction and should not have vacated reinstatement. | Cole: the Reinstatement Order was void for lack of plenary power (and lack of verification). | Court held the trial court erred, reversed the dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilde v. Murchie, 949 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1997) (trial-court orders given effect according to unambiguous language)
- Lane Bank Equipment Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2000) (timely postjudgment motion that seeks substantive change extends plenary power under Rule 329b)
- Mann v. Kendall Home Builders Construction Partners I, Ltd., 464 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015) (substance-over-form test: motion seeking substantive change extends plenary power)
- In re Chester, 309 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (discussing Rule 89/venue-transfer orders and limits on plenary power)
- Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970) (discussed as precedent on motion content but distinguished here)
- First Freeport Nat’l Bank v. Brazoswood Nat’l Bank, 712 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986) (older precedent on motion-to-modify limits, expressly displaced by later Supreme Court authority)