Alan Gregory Ender v. United States, 20-11985

Alan Ender, a federal prisoner, had his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion denied by the district court in March 2018.
Ender alleges his counsel failed to notify him of that denial and did not file a timely appeal or an out-of-time appeal.
Ender learned of the denial in December 2019 and filed a pro se motion styled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in April 2020.
The district court construed Ender’s Rule 60(b) filing as a request under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) to reopen the appeal period for lack of notice and denied relief as untimely.
Ender appealed the denial; the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the characterization of the motion de novo and the district court’s reopening decision for abuse of discretion.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Rule 4(a)(6) is the exclusive method to reopen for lack of notice and Ender’s filing was beyond Rule 4(a)(6)’s 180-day outer limit; attorney abandonment did not create an equitable exception.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court properly construed Ender’s Rule 60(b) motion as a Rule 4(a)(6) motion	Ender: motion sought equitable relief under Rule 60(b)(6), including relief for attorney abandonment, not merely lack of notice	Government/District Court: motion only complained of lack of notice; Rule 4(a)(6) is the exclusive vehicle to reopen time to appeal for lack of notice	Court: properly treated motion as Rule 4(a)(6) request and refused to permit Rule 60(b) to circumvent Rule 4 limits
Whether attorney abandonment or neglect provides an equitable exception to Rule 4(a)(6)’s time limits	Ender: counsel’s failure to notify or file an appeal amounted to abandonment that should allow relief	Government: no equitable exception exists to the jurisdictional appeal-period rules; Rule 60(b) cannot revive time to appeal	Court: attorney neglect does not create an exception; Rule 4(a)(6)’s 180-day outer limit controls; denial affirmed

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (appeal-period time limits are jurisdictional and courts may not create equitable exceptions)
Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017) (reinforcing jurisdictional nature of appeal deadlines)
Vencor Hosps., Inc. v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (Rule 4(a)(6) is the exclusive method to extend time to appeal for lack of notice and sets an outer 180-day limit)
Sanders v. United States, 113 F.3d 184 (11th Cir. 1997) (pro se claim of lack of notice will be treated as a Rule 4(a)(6) motion)
Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2006) (petitioner may not use Rule 60(b) to resuscitate time to file an appeal where counsel failed to act)
McDaniel v. Moore, 292 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (standard of review: denial of reopening appeal time reviewed for abuse of discretion)
United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) (interpretation of procedural rules reviewed de novo)