Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 631 F.3d 1031

City of Los Angeles enacted an adult-entertainment dispersal ordinance (L.A.M.C. § 12.70) in 1978, limiting proximity of two such businesses to 1,000 feet.
1983 amendments added a rule that no two adult-entertainment businesses could operate at the same location and that each business constitutes a separate entity even if in the same establishment.
Alameda Books and Highland Books operated as combined adult bookstores with in-store arcades, violating § 12.70 since their inception in the 1990s.
District court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, finding the ordinance failed to survive intermediate or strict scrutiny under the First Amendment after remand by the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court remanded with Alameda Books clarifying a burden-shifting framework to assess secondary-effects regulations; Kennedy concurrence cautioned against reducing speech proportionally to reduce secondary effects.
On remand, district court struck Spaulding declaration but accepted Andrus and Hinckley declarations, concluding plaintiffs showed actual and convincing evidence to invalidate the ordinance at summary judgment; court then held ordinance unconstitutional and granted relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Alameda Books burden-shifting framework applies at summary judgment	Alameda Books framework requires genuine casting of doubt on rationale.	City may rely on its initial rationale under Renton regardless of declarant bias.	Yes; the court must assess cast-doubt evidence; summary judgment improper if credibility issues exist.
Whether Andrus and Hinckley declarations satisfy 'actual and convincing' casting of doubt	Declarations show industry opinion that stand-alone arcades would fail; bias acknowledged but not dispositive.	Declarations are speculative, biased, and lack empirical support.	Declarations were insufficient and biased; district court erred in granting summary judgment.
Whether Spaulding's second declaration was properly excluded and remains admissible	Spaulding data supported arcades' profitability and viability as standalone units.	Declaration relied on speculative methodology and lacked foundation.	District court properly excluded Spaulding's second declaration.
Whether the statute of limitations bars the § 1983 claims	Waiver by the City cures potential limitations issue.	Statute of limitations remains a bar absent waiver.	Court reverses on limitations due to waiver by City; need not resolve on the merits.

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (establishes burden-shifting framework for secondary-effects ordinances)
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (three-part Renton framework for time/place/mvenue restrictions on speech)
Dream Palace v. Maricopa County, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2004) (applies Renton framework to dispersal of adult businesses; refinement of steps)
Ctr. for Fair Public Policy v. Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003) (requires evaluating municipal rationales and casting doubt on them)
Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasizes need for 'actual and convincing' evidence to cast doubt)
Imaginary Images, Inc. v. Evans, 612 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2010) (describes 'actual and convincing' standard for casting doubt)
World Wide Video v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) (discusses burden-shifting and alternative avenues of communication)
Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2005) (highlights credibility considerations in evaluating evidence)
Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (statutory limitations considerations in § 1983 cases)