Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama
135 S. Ct. 1257
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- After the 2010 Census Alabama redrew its 105 House and 35 Senate districts in 2012; the legislature prioritized very low population deviation (~±1%) and compliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (preclearance).
- Many preexisting majority‑minority districts were underpopulated; to meet equal‑population goals the legislature added large numbers of black residents to several majority‑black districts (e.g., Senate District 26 gained ~15,785 people, only 36 of whom were white).
- Plaintiffs (Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and Alabama Democratic Conference) alleged the plans were racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Shaw/Miller line) and raised other Voting Rights Act and one‑person‑one‑vote claims; a three‑judge District Court rejected the challenges after a bench trial.
- The Supreme Court granted review limited to racial‑gerrymandering claims and found multiple legal errors in the District Court’s analysis, vacating and remanding for further district‑specific proceedings.
- Key procedural errors identified: (1) treating the claim as a statewide challenge rather than district‑by‑district; (2) improperly resolving association standing for the Conference sua sponte without seeking supplementation; (3) misapplying the ‘‘predominance’’ inquiry by treating equal‑population objectives as an ordinary competing factor; and (4) misreading Section 5 as requiring maintenance of fixed minority percentages (affecting the narrow‑tailoring analysis).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Geographic scope of claim | Plaintiffs argued the State used race to draw many specific majority‑minority districts (or the policy as applied statewide) | State and dissent: plaintiffs limited to a statewide claim and waived district‑by‑district challenges | Court: racial‑gerrymander claims are district‑specific; plaintiffs did not waive district claims; remand to consider specific districts |
| Association standing (Conference) | Conference: is a statewide organization with members in almost every county, sufficient to infer members in challenged districts | State: record lacked proof members lived in specific challenged districts; District Court denied standing | Court: District Court erred by dismissing standing sua sponte without allowing supplementation; remand to permit member‑lists/evidence and State response |
| Predominance (was race the predominant factor?) | Plaintiffs: legislature subordinated traditional race‑neutral criteria to race (used racial targets to decide which voters to add) | State/District Court: equal‑population requirement was the primary motivator and may be weighed like any other nonracial factor | Court: equal‑population requirement is background law, not an ordinary competing factor; predominance analysis must focus on whether race, rather than traditional districting criteria, dictated which voters were placed in a district; remand to reassess predominance (e.g., SD26) |
| Narrow tailoring / compelling interest (Section 5) | Plaintiffs: using race to pack districts exceeded any permissible Section 5 need and may not be narrowly tailored | State/District Court: compliance with Section 5 (avoiding retrogression) is a compelling interest and justified race‑based choices; Section 5 required keeping minority percentages | Court: §5 requires preserving the minority group's ability to elect preferred candidates, not fixed numeric percentages; the District Court and legislature relied on a mechanical percentage standard and asked the wrong question; narrow‑tailoring requires a strong basis in evidence that the race‑based steps were necessary to preserve ability to elect; remand to reassess narrow‑tailoring under correct legal standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (racial gerrymandering violates Equal Protection; race as predominant factor triggers strict scrutiny)
- Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (race‑based districting that lacks adequate justification is forbidden)
- Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (plaintiff must show race was the predominant motivating factor for placing voters within or without a particular district)
- Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (courts must scrutinize each challenged district for racial predominance)
- United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (association standing requires members who would have standing individually, e.g., residing in challenged district)
- Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (one‑person, one‑vote population‑deviation standards)
- Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (‘‘strong basis in evidence’’ standard for race‑based government actions)
- Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (prior §5 retrogression analysis and flexibility in district composition)
- Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (§5 prohibits changes that would lead to retrogression in minority position)
