BEER ET AL. v. UNITED STATES ET AL.
No. 73-1869
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided March 30, 1976
Argued March 26, 1975—Reargued November 12, 1975
425 U.S. 130
James R. Stoner reargued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Blake G. Arata, Ernest L. Salatich, James R. Treese, and Ernest L. Ruffner.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace reargued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, John P. Rupp, Brian K. Landsberg, and Walter W. Barnett. Stanley A. Halpin, Jr., reargued the cause for appellees Jackson et al. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Eric Schnapper, and Wiley Branton.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 19651 prohibits
The city of New Orleans brought this suit under § 5 seeking a judgment declaring that a reapportionment of New Orleans’ councilmanic districts did not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.3 The District Court
I
New Orleans is a city of almost 600,000 people. Some 55% of that population is white and the remaining 45% is Negro. Some 65% of the registered voters are white, and the remaining 35% are Negro.4 In 1954, New Orleans adopted a mayor-council form of government. Since that time the municipal charter has provided that the city council is to consist of seven members, one to be elected from each of five councilmanic districts, and two to be elected by the voters of the city at large. The 1954 charter also requires an adjustment of the bound-
In 1961, the city council redistricted the city based on the 1960 census figures. That reapportionment plan established four districts that stretched from the edge of Lake Pontchartrain on the north side of the city to the Mississippi River on the city‘s south side. The fifth district was wedge shaped and encompassed the city‘s downtown area. In one of these councilmanic districts, Negroes constituted a majority of the population, but only about half of the registered voters. In the other four districts white voters clearly outnumbered Negro voters. No Negro was elected to the New Orleans City Council during the decade from 1960 to 1970.
After receipt of the 1970 census figures the city council adopted a reapportionment plan (Plan I) that continued the basic north-to-south pattern of councilmanic districts combined with a wedge-shaped, downtown district. Under Plan I Negroes constituted a majority of the population in two districts, but they did not make up a majority of registered voters in any district. The largest percentage of Negro voters in a single district under Plan I was 45.2%. When the city submitted Plan I to the Attorney General pursuant to § 5, he objected to it, stating that it appeared to “dilute black voting strength by combining a number of black voters with a larger number of white voters in each of the five districts.” He also expressed the view that “the district lines [were not] drawn as they [were] because of any compelling governmental need” and that the district lines did “not reflect numeric population configurations or considerations of district compactness or regularity of shape.”
Even before the Attorney General objected to Plan I, the city authorities had commenced work on a second plan—Plan II.5 That plan followed the general north-
The District Court concluded that Plan II would have the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.7 It calculated that if Negroes could elect city councilmen in proportion to their share of the city‘s registered voters, they would be able to choose 2.42 of the city‘s seven councilmen, and, if in proportion to their share of the city‘s population, to choose 3.15 councilmen.8 But under Plan II the District Court concluded
As a separate and independent ground for rejecting Plan II, the District Court held that the failure of the plan to alter the city charter provision establishing two at-large seats had the effect in itself of “abridging the right to vote... on account of race or color.” As the court put it: “[T]he City has not supported the choice of at-large elections by any consideration which would sat-
The District Court therefore refused to allow Plan II to go into effect. As a result there have been no councilmanic elections in New Orleans since 1970, and the councilmen elected at that time (or their appointed successors) have remained in office ever since.
II
A
The appellants urge, and the United States on reargument of this case has conceded, that the District Court was mistaken in holding that Plan II could be rejected under § 5 solely because it did not eliminate the two at-large councilmanic seats that had existed since 1954. The appellants and the United States are correct in their interpretation of the statute in this regard.
The language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures. “[D]iscriminatory practices... instituted prior to November 1964... are not subject to the requirement of preclearance [under § 5].” U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, p. 347. The ordinance that adopted Plan II made no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats had been established in 1954 by the city charter, an ordinance could not have altered them; any change in
B
The principal argument made by the appellants in this Court is that the District Court erred in concluding that the makeup of the five geographic councilmanic districts under Plan II would have the effect of abridging voting rights on account of race or color. In evaluating this claim it is important to note at the outset that the question is not one of constitutional law, but of statutory construction.11 A determination of when a legislative reapportionment has “the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” must depend, therefore, upon the intent of
The legislative history reveals that the basic purpose of Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act was “to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 315. Section 5 was intended to play an important role in achieving that goal:
“Section 5 was a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down. That practice had been possible because each new law remained in effect until the Justice Department or private plaintiffs were able to sustain the burden of proving that the new law, too, was discriminatory.... Congress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it could, ‘to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,’ by ‘freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory.‘” H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, pp. 57-58. (Footnotes omitted.)
See also H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9-11, 26; S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 6-9, 24; H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, pp. 6-8; H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, pp. 8-11, 57-60; S. Rep. No. 94-295, pp. 15-19; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 335.
By prohibiting the enforcement of a voting-procedure change until it has been demonstrated to the United States Department of Justice or to a three-judge federal court that the change does not have a discriminatory effect, Congress desired to prevent States from “undo-[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently won” by Negroes. H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, p. 8. Section 5 was intended
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1975, Congress explicitly stated that “the standard [under § 5] can only be fully satisfied by determining on the basis of the facts found by the Attorney General [or the District Court] to be true whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting....” H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 60 (emphasis added).12 In other words the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.
It is thus apparent that a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the “effect” of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5. We conclude, therefore, that such an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.
The application of this standard to the facts of the present case is straightforward. Under the apportionment of 1961 none of the five councilmanic districts had a clear Negro majority of registered voters, and no Negro
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
With MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, I cannot agree that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 reaches only those changes in election procedures that are more burdensome to the complaining minority than pre-existing procedures. As I understand § 5, the validity of any procedural change otherwise within the reach of the section must be determined under the statutory standard—whether the proposed legislation has the purpose or effect of abridging or denying the right to vote based on race or color.
This statutory standard is to be applied here in light of the District Court‘s findings, which are supported by the evidence and are not now questioned by the Court. The findings were that the nominating process in New Orleans’ councilmanic elections is subject to majority vote and “anti-single-shot” rules and that there is a history of bloc racial voting in New Orleans, the predictable result being that no Negro candidate will win in any district in which his race is in the minority. In my view, where these facts exist, combined with a segregated residential pattern, § 5 is not satisfied unless, to the extent practicable, the new electoral districts afford the Negro minority the opportunity to achieve legislative representation roughly proportional to the Negro population
Bloc racial voting is an unfortunate phenomenon, but we are repeatedly faced with the findings of knowledgeable district courts that it is a fact of life. Where it exists, most often the result is that neither white nor black can be elected from a district in which his race is in the minority. As I see it, Congress has the power to minimize the effects of racial voting, particularly where it occurs in the context of other electoral rules operating to muffle the political potential of the minority. I am also satisfied that § 5 was aimed at this end, among others, and should be so construed and applied. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370-372 (1975).
Minimizing the exclusionary effects of racial voting is possible here because whites and blacks are not scattered evenly throughout the city; to a great extent, each race is concentrated in identifiable areas of New Orleans. But like bloc voting by race, this too is a fact of life, well known to those responsible for drawing electoral district lines. These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district. It is here that § 5 intervenes to control these choices to the extent necessary to afford the minority the opportunity of achieving fair representation in the legislative body in question.
Applying § 5 in this way would at times require the drawing of district lines based on race; but Congress has this power where deliberate discrimination at the polls
Since Plan II at issue in this case falls short of satisfying § 5 and since I agree with MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL that the city has failed to present sufficiently substantial justifications for its proposal, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the District Court.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
Over the past 10 years the Court has, again and again, read the jurisdiction of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 89 Stat. 402, 404,
The Court never answers this question. Instead, it produces a convoluted construction of the statute that transforms the single question suggested by § 5 into three questions, and then provides precious little guidance in answering any of them.
Implicitly admitting as much, the Court adds another question, this one to be asked if the proposed plan is not “retrogressive“: whether “the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.” Ante, at 141. This addition does much—in theory, at least—to salvage the Court‘s test, since our decisions make clear that the proper test of abridgment under § 5 is essentially the constitutional inquiry.
Still, I cannot accept the Court‘s awkward construction. Not only is the Court‘s multiple-step inquiry unduly cumbersome and an unnecessary burden to place upon the Attorney General and the District Court for the District of Columbia, but the Court dilutes the meaning of unconstitutionality in this context to the point that the congressional purposes in § 5 are no longer served and the sacred guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments emerge badly battered. And in the process, the Court approves a blatantly discriminatory districting plan for the city of New Orleans. I dissent.
I
A
The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, § 1 .
Although the Amendment is self-enforcing, litigation to secure the rights it guarantees proved time consuming and ineffective, while the will of those who resisted its command was strong and unwavering. Finally Congress decided to intervene. In 1965 it enacted the Voting Rights Act, designed “to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 315. See also id., at 308-315. The Act proclaims that its purpose is “to enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution...,” 79 Stat. 437; the heart of its enforcement mechanism is § 5. In language that tracks that of the Fifteenth Amendment, § 5 declares that no State covered by the Act shall enforce any plan with respect to voting different from that in effect on November 1, 1964, unless the Attorney General or a three-judge District Court in the District of Columbia declares that such plan
“does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color....”
42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V) .1
While the substantive reach of § 5 is somewhat broader than that of the Fifteenth Amendment in at least one regard—the burden of proof is shifted from discriminatee
In justifying its convoluted construction of § 5, however, the Court never deals with the fact that, by its plain language, § 5 does no more than adopt, or arguably expand,5 the constitutional standard. Since it has never
The Act‘s limited term is proof that Congress intended to secure prompt, and not gradual, relief. Originally, the Act was intended to be in effect for only five years. While it has been twice extended, each extension was also for only a few years: five more years in 1970, and seven more years in 1975. Thus, it cannot be argued that the Act contemplated slow forward movement, which the Court‘s construction sanctifies, rather than a quick remedial “fix.”
Ultimately, the Court admits as much by adding an inquiry into whether the proposed plan, even if “ameliorative,” is constitutional. After this admission, I cannot understand why the Court bothers at all with its preliminary inquiry into the nature of the change of plans, since the inquiry not only adds nothing, but will, I fear, prove to be a time-consuming distraction from the important business of assessing the constitutionality of the proposed plan.12 Except for this unnecessary step, how-
turning the constitutional inquiry to the
B
The proper test in
“To sustain such claims [of dilution], it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs’ burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” White v. Regester, supra, at 765-766.
See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149.16
It is this constitutionally based concept of dilution that we have held to govern in
II
Application of these standards to the case before us is straightforward. Preliminarily, while I agree with the Court that the two at-large seats on the New Orleans City Council are not themselves before the Court for approval and cannot serve as an independent basis for the rejection of Plan II, I do not think Plan II should be assessed without regard to the seven-member council it is designed to fill. Proportional representation of Negroes among the five district seats on the council does not assure Negroes proportional representation on the entire council when, as the District Court found, the two at-large seats will be occupied by white-elected mem-
Thus the District Court correctly began by considering the seven-member council and a districting plan that, given New Orleans’ long history of racial bloc voting,20 allows Negroes the expectation of no more than one seat (14% of the council), if that, in a city with a 34.5% Negro voting population. Manifestly, the plan serves to underrepresent the Negro voting population. The District Court then, properly, turned to consider whether Negroes are excluded from full participation in the political processes in New Orleans. The court found con-
The court found that Louisiana‘s majority-vote requirement and “anti-single-shot” requirement operate as a practical matter to defeat Negroes in any district in which they do not constitute a majority,22 that residual effects of Louisiana‘s long history of racial discrimination not only in voting, but also in public schools, public assemblies, public recreational facilities, public transportation, housing, and employment, remain; and that city officeholders have generally been unresponsive to the needs of the Negro community. The court looked to the many tactics that, until recently, had been employed with remarkable success to keep Negroes from voting in the State. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 147-150 (1965). And the court found that Negro access to the political process is even further narrowed by the fact that candidates in the all-important Democratic primary run on tickets. For a city council candidate to win nomination, which is tantamount to victory in the general election, it is critical to be placed on the ticket of the winning, always white, mayoral candidate. Negro candidates for city council, however, have never been placed on such a ticket. Indeed, no Negro has ever
Since Negroes are underrepresented by Plan II and have been denied equal access to the political processes in New Orleans, Plan II infringes upon constitutionally protected rights, and only a compelling justification can save the plan. The very nature of the Negro community in New Orleans and the manner of its distortion by Plan II immediately place the city‘s explanations in a suspect light. The Negro community is not dispersed, but rather is collected in a concentrated curving band that runs roughly east-west. The districts in Plan II run north-south and divide the Negro community into five parts. Counsel for intervenor Jackson vividly described the effect of this division at oral argument:
“You can walk from Jefferson Parish throughout the city for eight or ten miles through the St. Bernard Parish line and not see a white face along that band, that black belt, that parallels the river in a curve fashion throughout the city. White people live in the very wealthy sections of town out by the lake and along St. Charles Avenue to the river. The rest is left over for blacks, and these are heavy concentrations, and that plan devised by the City Council slices up that population like so many pieces of bologna. . . .” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
As Jonathan A. Eckert, the council staff member pri-
New Orleans relies on seven goals that it claims mandate a north-south scheme such as Plan II. The city‘s own belief in this conclusion is questionable in light of Mr. Eckert‘s testimony in the District Court that he and his staff had drafted at least two east-west plans that satisfied them. 1 App. 336-337. In any case, however, the asserted goals, whether taken alone or in combination, do not establish a compelling justification for the plan. One claimed purpose is to prevent dilution of the vote of minority groups. Plan II plainly does not achieve this goal. Two other asserted aims are to achieve substantial numerical equality among the five districts and to keep the resultant districts compact and contiguous. Both aims can be accomplished by any number of east-west plans as well. Three more proffered justifications are to preserve ward and precinct lines, natural boundaries, and manmade boundaries. But there are findings that ward lines cannot be observed in any case because of one-person, one-vote restrictions, and that precincts are sufficiently small that their integrity can be honored in east-west districts. This latter fact minimizes any adverse effects of violating natural and manmade boundaries, except to the extent that they divide communities of different social or economic interests. And Plan II only erratically keeps such communities intact.
It is only the seventh of the proffered goals that, if compelling, mandates a north-south scheme: keeping incumbents apart in the new districts so that they will
Thus, the city has failed to show an acceptable justification for the racially dilutive effect of Plan II. Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that appellants failed to demonstrate that Plan II would not have the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race, and correctly denied the requested declaratory judgment.24
Notes
of course, purpose may conclusively be shown, it too should be sufficient to demonstrate a statute‘s unconstitutionality.
While the Court does quote language that suggests some of the other purposes that I see in the statute, ante, at 140, when it comes to giving substantive content to
It may be that this single purpose looms so large to the Court because it thinks it would be counterproductive to bar enforcement of a proposed plan, even if discriminatory, that is at all less discriminatory than the pre-existing plan, which would otherwise remain frozen in effect. While this argument has superficial appeal, it is ultimately unrealistic because it will be a rare jurisdiction that can retain its pre-existing apportionment after the rejection of a modification by the Attorney General or District Court. Jurisdictions do not undertake redistricting without reason. In this case, for instance, the New Orleans City Charter requires redistricting every 10 years. If the plan before us now were disapproved, New Orleans would have to produce a new one or amend its charter. In other cases, redistricting will have been constitutionally compelled by our one-person, one-vote decisions. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964). The virtual necessity of prompt redistricting argues strongly in favor of rejecting “ameliorative” but still discriminatory redistricting plans. The jurisdictions will eventually have to return with a nondiscriminatory plan.
Equally unsuccessful is the Court‘s attempt to paint the “ameliorative” changes in this case as dramatic. Negroes constitute 45% of the population of New Orleans and 34.5% of the city‘s registered
H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, pp. 6–7 (1969). See also H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11 (1965); S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 8, 12 (1965); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 315-316, 335.
S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 15 (1975). See also H. R. Rep. No. 439, supra, at 10-11. It is for this reason that the existing plan remains “frozen” in effect while the proposed plan is submitted for approval. Thus, any constitutional litigation may proceed without interruption, unless the new plan is itself found to be nondiscriminatory and is substituted. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 58 (1975). Either way, the litigant obtains the relief he seeks—a nondiscriminatory apportionment.
The pressure of having proposed plans judged by rigorous standards and the fear of litigation over new plans were thought to encourage covered jurisdictions to end all discrimination in voting. “The preclearance procedure—and this is critical—serves psychologically to control the proliferation of discriminatory laws and practices because each change must first be federally reviewed. Thus section 5 serves to prevent discrimination before it starts.” 115 Cong. Rec. 38486 (1969) (remarks of Rep. McCulloch). See also id., at 38517 (remarks of Rep. Anderson); U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, pp. 30-31 (1975).
While I read “abridge” in both
Today the Court finds it simple to conclude that Plan II is “ameliorative,” but it will not always be so easy to determine whether a new plan increases or decreases Negro voting power relative to the prior plan. To the contrary, I believe the Court‘s test will prove unduly difficult of application and excessively demanding of judicial energies.
For instance, the Court today finds that an increase in the size of the Negro majority in one district, with a concomitant increased likelihood of electing a delegate, conclusively shows that Plan II is ameliorative. Will that always be so? Is it not as common for minorities to be gerrymandered into the same district as into separate ones? Is an increase in the size of an existing majority ameliorative or retrogressive? When the size of the majority increases in one district, Negro voting strength necessarily declines elsewhere. Is that decline retrogressive? Assuming that the shift from a 50.2% to a 52.6% majority in District B in this case is ameliorative, and is not outweighed by the simultaneous decrease in Negro voting strength in Districts A and C, when would an increase become retrogressive? As soon as the majority becomes “safe“? When the majority is achieved by dividing pre-existing concentrations of Negro voters?
Moreover, the Court implies, ante, at 139 n. 11, by its attempt to harmonize its holding today with City of Richmond v. United States, supra, that this preliminary inquiry into the nature of the change is the proper approach to all
I realize, of course, that determining the ultimate question of “abridgment” may involve answering questions similar to those I have posed above and that those questions will be just as difficult to answer. My point, however, is exactly that the inquiry is a difficult one, and that there is no reason substantially to compound that complexity by posing an unnecessary and equally complex preliminary inquiry.
As I understand it, the Court views the constitutional inquiry as part of the
The Court‘s treatment of the constitutional questions is all the more puzzling if it intends to confine its constitutional analysis to those seats brought before the District Court in the
Because I read
Seeking another source for a
The Court refers to the cited page for the proposition that members of a minority group have no federal right “to be represented in legislative bodies in proportion to their number in the general population.” Ante, at 136-137, n. 8. Whitcomb v. Chavis stands for no such proposition. The language the Court refers to is substantively identical to that quoted in the text and supports only the notion that there is no right to proportional representation absent evidence of denial of access to the political process.
The cases make clear that the inquiry is not meant to be limited to the ability of the minority group to participate in the voting plan under attack, but also includes sweeping analysis of the minority group‘s past and present treatment by the jurisdiction before the court. White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 766-767; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149-153.
For instance, a city with a 20% Negro population and a five-member council elected in wards might be able to justify the placement of only 20% minority population in each district, despite a history of denial of access to the political process, by showing that the minority population was perfectly distributed throughout the municipality so that the creation of a Negro-majority ward was an impossibility. On the other hand, again assuming a history of denial of access to the political process, such a plan could not survive attack if the 20% Negro population of each ward were achieved by dividing five ways a concentrated bloc of Negro voters located in the center of the city.
This effect is clear in this case, where Negroes constitute 34.5% of the New Orleans electorate. Out of seven seats, Negroes should reasonably expect to control at least two. In considering only five seats, the Court suggests—properly, given its self-imposed limitation—that Negroes should have an expectancy of only one seat. Ante, at 137 n. 8. If only two of the five districts were before us, and assuming a 34.5% minority share of the voting population in those districts, the Court could properly conclude that Negroes could lay claim to neither of the two seats. Thus, under the Court‘s approach, the smaller the number of seats that the city may present for consideration, the grosser the discrimination that may be numerically tolerated.
The tendency to racial bloc voting in New Orleans is a finding of fact by the District Court that is not challenged here. Such voting was encouraged until 1964 by a Louisiana statute, declared unconstitutional in Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399 (1964), that required the race of each candidate to be printed on the ballots used in all elections within the State.
Appellants challenge the propriety of looking at this evidence in assessing the effect of Plan II, not its accuracy.
The majority-vote requirement is a rule that the winner of an election must have a majority of the vote. Thus, in a race involving three or more candidates, a plurality of voters cannot elect their candidate. If no candidate wins a majority, there is a run-off election.
The “anti-single-shot” rule is a requirement that in a multi-member district the voter must vote for as many candidates as there are seats to be filled. Thus, although the voter may be interested in only one of the candidates, he must vote for others as well.
The city asserts that its seventh goal is to retain “historic and traditional councilmanic district boundaries” so as to “preserve continuity within the electorate.” Brief for Appellants 28-29. In fact, the record is conclusive that the goal was purely to keep incumbents apart. 1 App. 206-207; 2 App. 344, 557.
While the Court today finds that the District Court erred in finding a discriminatory effect, it does not address the issue not reached by the District Court: whether Plan II was drafted with a discriminatory purpose. Of course, this question remains on remand. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S., at 378-379.
