290 F. Supp. 3d 852
E.D. Ill.2017Background
- Plaintiff Lu Aku, an African-American teacher at Brooks, alleges that Principal D'Andre Weaver reassigned duties, gave adverse evaluations, and did not rehire him for 2014–15; Aku claims these acts were race, age, sex, color, national-origin, and disability discrimination and retaliation.
- Aku filed multiple administrative charges with the IDHR/EEOC and pursued workers' compensation; he received an EEOC right-to-sue letter and sued the Board, Weaver, and 13 Non-Board Defendants asserting Title VII, ADEA, ADA, §§ 1981/1983, and related claims.
- Non-Board Defendants include the Chicago Teachers Union, two claims administrators (Sedgwick, Cannon), treating physician (Parkview), attorneys and the ARDC, IHRC, and IDHR; Aku alleged they aided, abetted, or conspired with the Board.
- The Board and twelve Non-Board Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court granted the non-Board motions in full (dismissed with prejudice claims against them), dismissed many claims against Weaver and the Board, but preserved Aku’s Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims (and related retaliation claims) against the Board.
- The Court dismissed § 1983 (Monell) claims against the Board for failure to plead a Board-wide policy/custom or a final policymaker, dismissed official-capacity and individual ADEA/ADA/Title VII claims against Weaver (statutes do not permit individual liability), and dismissed ARDC claims for lack of standing/sovereign immunity and Clauss’s claims on arbitral immunity grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Weaver can be individually liable under Title VII, ADA, ADEA | Weaver directly caused discriminatory acts; suit against him is proper | These statutes provide liability only against employers, not individual supervisors | Dismissed: individual-capacity ADEA/ADA/Title VII claims against Weaver are not permitted |
| Whether claims based on earlier terminations are barred for failure to exhaust/timeliness | Aku relied on EEOC/IDHR administrative process and his broad EEOC charge supports claims | Board: Aku’s EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after some alleged acts, so claims (1)-(3) untimely | Denied as basis for dismissal: exhaustion/timeliness is an affirmative defense and complaint does not plead plaintiff out of court |
| Whether § 1983/§ 1981 claims can proceed against the Board (Monell) | Board’s actions at Brooks evidence a pattern of race-based dismissals constituting custom/policy | Board: no Board-wide discriminatory policy alleged; Weaver is not a final policymaker under Illinois law | Granted for Board: § 1983/§ 1981 claims dismissed for failure to allege policy/custom or final policymaker |
| Whether Non-Board Defendants can be liable under Title VII/ADA (aiding/abetting/conspiracy) | Non-Board Defendants aided and conspired with Board to discriminate and retaliate | Title VII/ADA impose liability only on employers (and agents’ acts are imputed to employer), not third parties/individuals | Dismissed with prejudice: aiding/abetting/conspiracy claims under Title VII/ADA against Non-Board Defendants fail as a matter of law |
| Whether ARDC and arbitrator (Clauss) claims can proceed | ARDC failed to discipline attorneys; arbitrator acted improperly at arbitration | ARDC: no injury traceable to it and is protected by sovereign immunity; Clauss: entitled to absolute arbitral immunity | Dismissed: ARDC claims dismissed for lack of standing/Eleventh Amendment; Clauss dismissed on arbitral immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) complaints)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (legal conclusions insufficient; pleading must show plausible entitlement to relief)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy, custom, or final policymaker)
- Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788 (ADA provides employer, not individual, liability)
- Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (supervisor not individually liable under Title VII)
- Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697 (Title VII liability requires an employment relationship or agent-imputed liability limited to employer)
- Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377 (must prove existence of employment relationship to maintain Title VII action against a defendant)
- Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cty., 752 F.3d 665 (§ 1983 is the exclusive remedy for § 1981 claims against state actors)
- Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894 (Rule 12(b)(1) standard; accept well-pleaded facts but court may consider evidence on jurisdiction)
- Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188 (court may look beyond pleadings on jurisdictional matters)