1:19-cv-03763
S.D.N.Y.May 4, 2021Background
- Armeen Akhtar, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent, worked for Saudia at JFK for ~22 years and was terminated July 31, 2017. She alleges long‑running gender and national‑origin/ethnicity discrimination and retaliation.
- Beginning in 2011 her station manager, Husam Al Subaiy, allegedly used the slur “Paki,” excluded Pakistani employees, denied training, assigned menial/personal tasks, altered shifts, and otherwise treated Akhtar worse than male/non‑Pakistani coworkers.
- Akhtar filed an EEOC charge (first charge in 2014/2013 period) and alleges intensified retaliation thereafter (exclusion from meetings/training, removal of title/desk, hostile coworker conduct). She filed a second EEOC charge on April 2, 2018 and received a right‑to‑sue notice in March 2019.
- Defendant moved to dismiss portions of the Amended Complaint: (1) Section 1981 national‑origin claims; (2) Title VII national‑origin claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) claims based on allegedly time‑barred discrete acts under Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL.
- The court treated the pleadings as true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, permitted amendment to clarify Section 1981 claims as ancestry/ethnicity‑based, found Title VII national‑origin claims exhausted, dismissed only time‑barred discrete acts for Title VII/NYSHRL, and allowed hostile‑work‑environment and NYCHRL claims to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 1981 permits national‑origin claims | Akhtar: her facts show discrimination based on Pakistani ancestry/ethnicity (not merely national origin) | Saudia: §1981 does not cover national‑origin claims; dismiss §1981 national‑origin claims | Court: §1981 does not reach pure national‑origin claims but pleadings plausibly allege ancestry/ethnicity; allowed amendment to assert §1981 ancestry/ethnicity claims |
| Whether Title VII national‑origin claim was administratively exhausted | Akhtar: Second EEOC Charge put EEOC on notice of national‑origin/ethnicity discrimination despite not using the words “national origin” in the narrative | Saudia: Charge did not adequately indicate national‑origin basis; claim is unexhausted and must be dismissed | Court: factual allegations and checked box(s) gave adequate notice; Title VII national‑origin claim exhausted |
| Whether alleged discrete acts before the limitations period are time‑barred under Title VII and NYSHRL | Akhtar: the misconduct is continuous/part of hostile work environment and thus timely under continuing‑violation theory | Saudia: many complained‑of acts are discrete, time‑barred, and cannot be pulled into timely claims by later events (e.g., termination) | Court: discrete acts outside the 300‑day (Title VII) / 3‑year (NYSHRL) periods are barred; but hostile‑work‑environment claim survives and may incorporate earlier acts that are part of the continuing hostile environment |
| Whether NYCHRL claims and pre‑limitations acts survive | Akhtar: NYCHRL is construed liberally and continuing violations doctrine applies to related, continuing discriminatory practice | Saudia: earlier discrete acts are time‑barred | Court: Under NYCHRL’s broader, liberal standard, claim survives at this stage; whether specific earlier acts are timely is a fact‑intensive issue reserved for later stages |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading requires factual content to raise plausible claim)
- Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (elements for §1981 discrimination claim)
- Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167 (§1981 does not reach national‑origin claims)
- Saint Francis College v. Al‑Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (§1981 protects discrimination based on ancestry/ethnic characteristics)
- Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195 (caution against drawing fine distinctions between race and national origin at pleading stage)
- Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67 (EEOC charge must give adequate notice; claims reasonably related to charge may be exhausted)
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (discrete acts are time‑barred if untimely; hostile work environment treated differently)
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (hostile work environment standard)
- McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc., 609 F.3d 70 (limitations and continuing‑violation analysis under Title VII)
- Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102 (NYCHRL construed liberally)
- Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229 (NYSHRL statute of limitations)
- Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499 (court draws reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor at pleading stage)