906 F.3d 1049
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- EPA promulgated the "Chemical Disaster Rule" (RMP revisions) on Jan 13, 2017, with staggered effective/compliance dates (overall effective date Mar 14, 2017; some provisions delayed 1–3 years).
- After a change in administration, EPA first delayed the rule briefly under a White House memorandum and then granted petitions for reconsideration under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B), issuing a 90-day administrative stay.
- While in that stay, EPA issued a final "Delay Rule" (June 14, 2017) pushing the Chemical Disaster Rule’s overall effective date to Feb 19, 2019 — a 20‑month delay — citing authority under both § 7607(d) and § 7412(r)(7).
- Community groups and several states challenged the Delay Rule, arguing EPA exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously; industry intervened in support of EPA.
- The D.C. Circuit held petitioners had Article III standing (union members and state proprietary interests) and addressed whether EPA lawfully delayed the rule and whether the Delay Rule was arbitrary and capricious.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether EPA could delay the rule beyond the 3‑month stay limit tied to reconsideration petitions under § 7607(d)(7)(B) | EPA may not use broader rulemaking authority to evade § 7607(d)(7)(B)’s 3‑month limit | EPA relied on § 7412(r)(7)’s general effective‑date language to justify a longer delay | The court held EPA cannot avoid the specific three‑month statutory limit by invoking broader statutory authority; delay exceeded § 7607(d)(7)(B) limits and was unlawful |
| Whether § 7412(r)(7) independently authorized the 20‑month delay | § 7412(r)(7) does not permit indefinite or extensive delay because it requires effective dates that "assure compliance as expeditiously as practicable" and incorporates the § 7607(d)(7)(B) limit | EPA argued § 7412(r)(7) gives the Administrator discretion to set effective dates as expeditiously as practicable and thus can justify the 20‑month postponement | The court held § 7412(r)(7) does not support the Delay Rule: EPA made no substantive regulatory change or findings about practicable compliance time and used reconsideration as grounds to delay, undermining § 7412(r)(7)’s objectives |
| Whether the Delay Rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act | The Delay Rule lacked reasoned explanation: EPA failed to justify why effectiveness would impede reconsideration, failed to explain departure from earlier findings on compliance timelines, and relied on speculative concerns | EPA asserted the delay was needed to allow reconsideration, additional notice‑and‑comment, and to avoid imposing compliance burdens while review was pending | The court held the Delay Rule was arbitrary and capricious: EPA did not provide adequate reasons for reversing its prior determinations or for the 20‑month length of delay |
| Whether petitioners had standing to challenge the Delay Rule | Petitioners (community groups, union, states) showed concrete injuries from delayed protections (worker/community safety; state response costs) | EPA/Industry contested standing but did not rebut petitioners’ declarations and proprietary/state interests | The court found petitioners had Article III standing based on union members’ workplace/community risk and states’ proprietary expenditures |
Key Cases Cited
- Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (interpreting § 7607(d)(7)(B) and stay/reconsideration limits)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agencysummary review under statutory delegation framework)
- NRDC v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (general rulemaking authority cannot override specific statutory constraints)
- Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (the specific governs the general when statutes conflict)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (agency must provide a reasoned explanation; arbitrary and capricious standard)
- FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (requirements when an agency changes course)
- Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (specific statutory provisions can limit general delegation authority)
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) (unexplained inconsistency can render an agency action arbitrary)