530 P.3d 959
Utah Ct. App.2023Background
- In Feb 2019 Aguila underwent an abortion at a Planned Parenthood clinic where Adriana Navarro worked as a medical assistant; Navarro allegedly disclosed Aguila’s procedure details to acquaintances and on social media.
- Aguila served a Health Care Malpractice Act (the Act) prelitigation notice on Planned Parenthood but did not serve Navarro; she later received a certificate of compliance as to Planned Parenthood.
- Aguila sued Navarro (negligence, breach of fiduciary duty) and Planned Parenthood (vicarious liability and negligent hiring/training/supervision).
- Planned Parenthood moved to dismiss, arguing (1) Aguila failed to serve Navarro with the Act’s required notice (jurisdictional defect), (2) Navarro’s conduct was outside the scope of employment (so no vicarious liability), and (3) Aguila failed to plead Navarro was employed at the time.
- The district court dismissed all claims: it concluded Aguila lacked jurisdiction to sue Navarro for malpractice (no notice) and ruled Navarro’s disclosure could not, as a matter of law, be within the scope of employment and that Aguila failed to plead employment.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of claims against Navarro for lack of prelitigation notice, but reversed dismissal of claims against Planned Parenthood, holding Aguila sufficiently pled employment and that whether the disclosure was within scope of employment is a fact question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Aguila sufficiently plead that Navarro was employed by Planned Parenthood when the disclosure occurred? | Aguila alleged Navarro was a Planned Parenthood medical assistant and pled Navarro acted "in the course and scope of her employment"; these facts permit an inference of employment. | Planned Parenthood argued Aguila failed to allege (even on information and belief) that Navarro was employed at the time, so no basis for vicarious liability. | Court: Aguila sufficiently pleaded an employer–employee relationship; district court erred to dismiss on this ground. |
| Can an employee’s illegal disclosure (potential HIPAA violation) be within the course and scope of employment as a matter of law? | Aguila: Illegal acts can still be within scope if they are of the kind the employee was hired to perform or motivated at least in part to serve the employer’s interest. | Planned Parenthood: Disclosure that could expose the employer to civil/criminal penalties cannot be within scope as a matter of law. | Court: Reversed district court; whether the disclosure was within scope is ordinarily a question of fact, not resolved on a 12(b)(6) motion. |
| Is Navarro a "health care provider" under the Act and do Aguila’s claims against Navarro constitute a malpractice action requiring prelitigation notice? | Aguila: Navarro’s disclosure is not a malpractice claim or she is not a health care provider for Act purposes. | Planned Parenthood: Navarro, a medical assistant handling patient information and interacting about procedures, is a health care provider; her disclosure relates to health care and so Act notice applies. | Court: Agreed with Planned Parenthood; Navarro is a health care provider and the claims against her are malpractice claims subject to the Act’s notice requirements. Dismissal of Aguila’s claims against Navarro for lack of notice affirmed. |
| Should Aguila’s direct and vicarious claims against Planned Parenthood have been dismissed? | Aguila: Claims against Planned Parenthood survive because employment and scope allegations suffice and notice was served on Planned Parenthood. | Planned Parenthood: No vicarious liability because no employment alleged and disclosure outside scope; also argued notice deficiency as to Navarro invalidates related claims. | Court: Reversed dismissal of claims against Planned Parenthood and remanded; those issues survive because employment was pled and scope is a factual inquiry. |
Key Cases Cited
- Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 203 P.3d 962 (Utah 2009) (standard for reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 243 P.3d 1275 (Utah 2010) (12(b)(6) dismissal principles)
- M.J. v. Wisan, 371 P.3d 21 (Utah 2016) (tests for whether acts fall within course and scope of employment)
- Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994) (employee acts may be methods of carrying out employment objectives even if improper)
- Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (employer vicarious liability when employee partly motivated to further employer’s business)
- Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 197 P.3d 654 (Utah 2008) (whether employee acted within course and scope is ordinarily a question for the factfinder)
- Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 862 N.E.2d 985 (Ill. 2007) (disclosure of medical information: scope-of-employment is a factual question)
- Korntved v. Advanced Healthcare, SC, 704 N.W.2d 597 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (disclosure in violation of employer policy may be outside scope but is generally a jury question)