276 F. Supp. 3d 7
S.D.N.Y.2017Background
- Agor, a Nigerian physician, entered the U.S. on a B-2 visa in 1998, overstayed, and later completed U.S. medical residency and board certification.
- In 1999 Agor filed an I-140 petition (classifying him as an “outstanding professor or researcher”) that listed Columbia University and an employer address but was signed and submitted as a self-petition; no bona fide U.S. employer sponsorship or employment offer existed.
- INS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny in October 2000 requesting an employer-signed I-140; Agor did not respond, and INS denied the 1999 I-140 in November 2000.
- Agor applied to adjust status in 2004 and again in 2009, claiming grandfathering under INA §245(i) based on the 1999 I-140; USCIS denied adjustment because the 1999 I-140 was not “approvable when filed” (not properly filed, meritorious, and non-frivolous).
- Agor alleged he was a victim of fraud by his representative (William Smart), and that he never received the 2000 notices; USCIS treated the 2000 denial as a denial on the merits and denied reopening. Agor sued under the APA seeking review of USCIS’s eligibility determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review USCIS denial of adjustment based on eligibility (grandfathering) | Agor: eligibility is a nondiscretionary legal question reviewable in district court | Gov: §1252 generally strips district courts of review of discretionary adjustment decisions, but nondiscretionary eligibility questions remain reviewable | Court: District court has jurisdiction to review nondiscretionary eligibility determinations (statutory eligibility), but cannot order discretionary approval |
| Whether the 1999 I-140 was “approvable when filed” (specifically meritorious in fact) | Agor: the I-140 was properly filed (signed/fee), he was credentialed and could have qualified, and failed notices were due to representative’s fraud | Gov: I-140 was not meritorious because it was self-filed for a category requiring employer sponsorship and contained false employer assertions | Court: 1999 I-140 was not meritorious—it lacked employer sponsorship and a bona fide offer; USCIS’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious |
| Whether alleged fraud by Agor’s representative or nonreceipt of notices invalidates the 1999 denial for grandfathering purposes | Agor: fraud prevented him from responding and pursuing other filings before the cutoff | Gov: fraud allegations do not cure the facial deficiencies of the petition; record shows petitioner knew no employer sponsored the filing | Court: Fraud claims and nonreceipt do not change the non-discretionary legal conclusion that the petition as filed was not meritorious |
| Whether evidence of Agor’s later-approved NIW I-140 or other classifications retroactively makes the 1999 petition approvable when filed | Agor: his later national interest waiver and credentials show merit; alternative classifications could have applied | Gov: eligibility must be judged based on circumstances at the time and on the petition actually filed | Court: Later approvals or alternative theories irrelevant; review is confined to the actual 1999 petition and its merits at filing; petition failed that test |
Key Cases Cited
- Henley v. Food & Drug Admin., 77 F.3d 616 (2d Cir. 1996) (standard for arbitrary and capricious review)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (agency action review framework)
- Karpova v. Snow, 497 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (deference to agency and requirements for reasoned explanation)
- Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing nondiscretionary eligibility review from discretionary relief precluded by §1252)
- Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) (two-step adjustment process: eligibility then discretion)
- Ogundipe v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2008) (meritorious-in-fact assessed by whether beneficiary qualified at filing)
- FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (court’s independent obligation to examine jurisdiction)
