Aero at Sp. Z.O.O. v. Dennis Gartman and Jerry K. Baker
469 S.W.3d 314
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Appellant Aero at Sp. z.o.o., a Polish company, had a final default judgment entered against it on July 1, 2014; service was effected under the Hague Convention and service was not contested.
- Within 30 days (July 30, 2014), Aero filed a special appearance in the trial court asserting lack of personal jurisdiction and asking the court to dismiss the suit and award costs; no hearing was held on that filing.
- Aero did not file a timely notice of appeal within the ordinary 30- or 90-day windows; its notice was mailed in October and a motion to extend was denied for lack of reasonable grounds.
- The central procedural question was whether the July 30 special appearance, filed after entry of default judgment but within 30 days, constituted a timely postjudgment motion that extended the trial court’s plenary power and thus precluded a restricted appeal under Tex. R. App. P. 30.
- The court concluded the special appearance effectively sought vacation of the default judgment and therefore qualified as a postjudgment motion filed within 30 days, extending the appellate timetable and barring a restricted appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a special appearance filed within 30 days after a default judgment counts as a postjudgment motion that precludes a restricted appeal | Aero argued the special appearance is a jurisdictional challenge, not a postjudgment motion, and thus it may pursue a restricted appeal | Gartman and Baker argued the special appearance implicitly sought vacatur of the judgment and thus was a timely postjudgment motion extending the appellate timetable | The court held the special appearance, filed within 30 days and requesting dismissal, was a postjudgment motion that extended the appellate timetable and precluded a restricted appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apts., J.V., 811 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1991) (describing restricted appeal as a direct attack on judgment)
- Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip. Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2000) (trial court retains plenary power 30 days; timely postjudgment motions extend appellate timetable)
- Gomez v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 896 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1995) (postjudgment filings that assail judgment extend appellate timetable)
- Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Mid-Town Surgical Ctr., Inc., 16 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000) (timely motion to set aside default judgment precluded restricted appeal)
- Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991) (timely postjudgment motions preclude restricted appeal)
- Clopton v. Pak, 66 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001) (restricted-appeal requirements are jurisdictional)
