Adrian E. v. Department of Child Safety
239 Ariz. 240
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Adrian (father) and Crystal (mother) divorced in 2010; Crystal was awarded sole custody and Adrian reasonable parenting time. Children were removed multiple times between 2010–2012; both parents were adjudicated dependent at various points.
- In October 2013 the parents entered a mediated parenting agreement adopted by the family court: Crystal received sole legal decision-making and primary physical custody; Adrian received highly restricted supervised parenting time.
- Dependency was dismissed in October 2013 after the children were placed with Crystal. In June 2014 the children were removed from Crystal for alleged neglect/abuse and substance use, and a new dependency was filed.
- DCS filed petitions to terminate both parents’ rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11) (prior removal/return/removal within 18 months). The juvenile court terminated both parents’ rights in March 2015, finding the statutory elements satisfied and that termination was in the children’s best interests.
- On appeal, DCS conceded that § 8-533(B)(11) could not properly be applied to Adrian given his limited supervised parenting time; the court of appeals agreed and reversed the termination of Adrian’s parental rights.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Appellee's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 8-533(B)(11) applies to a parent (Adrian) who only had supervised parenting time after dismissal of dependency | Adrian: subsection (B)(11) requires the child to have been returned to that parent’s legal custody; he had only supervised parenting time, not legal custody | DCS originally: "legal custody" in title 8 differs from "legal decision-making" in title 25 and could apply to a parent like Crystal; later conceded it doesn’t apply to a parent with only supervised parenting time | Court: § 8-533(B)(11) does not apply to Adrian; statute targets the parent to whom the child was returned (Crystal), not a different parent with restricted parenting time |
| Whether interpreting § 8-533(B)(11) to permit severance of a non-custodial parent based solely on the custodial parent’s conduct is permissible | Adrian: such an interpretation would allow termination based on another parent’s conduct and violate due process | DCS: argued titles 8 and 25 use different terms and meanings but ultimately conceded error as to Adrian | Court: such an interpretation would lead to an absurd result and could violate parental due process; statute must be read to target the parent from whom the child was returned and later removed |
Key Cases Cited
- Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205 (App. 2008) (standard for viewing evidence in dependency/severance appeals)
- In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424 (App. 2001) (de novo review for statutory interpretation in juvenile cases)
- E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56 (App. 2015) (guidance on resolving statutory ambiguity and avoiding absurd results)
- Baker v. Meyer, 237 Ariz. 112 (App. 2015) (policy favoring substantial, meaningful parenting time under title 25 reforms)
- Blake v. Schwartz, 202 Ariz. 120 (App. 2002) (principle that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional problems)
