E.R., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Jorge B., Appellees.
No. 1 CA-JV 14-0220.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.
March 5, 2015.
344 P.3d 842
Law Office of Michelle Ratner, By Michelle L. Ratner, Flagstaff, Counsel for Appellee.
Presiding Judge ANDREW W. GOULD delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge MAURICE PORTLEY and Judge JON W. THOMPSON joined.
OPINION
GOULD, Judge:
¶ 1 Appellant Guardian Ad Litem, on behalf of the minor child E.R., appeals from the juvenile court‘s order denying the Department of Child Safety‘s (“DCS“) petition to terminate Jorge B.‘s (“Father“) parental rights. For the following reasons, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 2 In October 2012, DCS received a repоrt that Mother was abusing E.R. and her three other minor children (collectively the “children“). At the time of the report, Mother and children were living with Father. The children were removed from Father‘s home and dependеncy petitions were filed as to both parents. The juvenile court later determined the children were dependent as to Father on the grounds Father failed to protect them from Mother‘s abuse.
¶ 3 While the dependency proceeding was pending, Mother was charged with criminal child abuse pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.“) section
¶ 4 After the criminal charges were filed against Mother, DCS filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother and Father‘s parental rights. DCS moved to terminate Father‘s rights on thе grounds (1) he knew or reasonably should have known that Mother was abusing E.R. pursuant to
¶ 5 A severance trial was held on multiple datеs between January 2014 and June 2014. At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court concluded that Mother “certainly abused the children and that abuse was unwarranted and extremely inappropriate.” The juvenile court made several findings in support of this conclusion. The court found that Mother “had struck [E.R.] with a hose, spoons, belt or shoes leaving bruises on his legs, ankles and feet.” The court noted that E.R. “had bruises and scars when he was brought into care[,]” “[s]ome were black and blue, some brownish or yellowish[,]” and that he “had some healing scars, some new scars.” E.R.‘s older siblings “expressed fear of their [M]other,” reporting that “Mother would hit [E.R.] and them with whatever was available,” and that “most of [M]other‘s aggression was directed towards [E.R.].” Additionally, Mother “would put spices” in E.R.‘s food making it inedible. As a result, when E.R. was removed from Father‘s home and placed in foster care, he “had a distended stomach” and was only in “the third percentile for weight.”
¶ 6 The juvenile court also concluded that “Father was aware or should have been aware of [Mother‘s] abusе.” The juvenile court determined that Father had noticed bruising on E.R. while Mother was living in Father‘s house. While most incidences of abuse occurred when Father was gone, on occasion Father was present аnd “would try to intervene.” After learning that Mother was feeding spicy food to E.R., Father attempted to provide edible food to E.R.; however, when Mother was present “she would not let [F]ather give [E.R.] any food.”
¶ 7 Desрite these factual findings, the juvenile court denied the severance petitions as to both Mother and Father based on
DISCUSSION
¶ 8 Appellant first argues the juvenile court erred in denying severance based on
¶ 9 We review de novo the juvenile court‘s construction of
¶ 10 When interpreting a statute our goal is to give effect to the legislative intent. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep‘t. Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 509, ¶ 9, 200 P.3d 1003, 1006 (App.2008). If a statute‘s language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation, unless doing so would lead to impossible or absurd results. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 234 Ariz. 343, 345, ¶ 13, 322 P.3d 160, 162 (2014); Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003); State v. Flores, 160 Ariz. 235, 239, 772 P.2d 589, 593 (App.1989). If a statute‘s language is ambiguous, we attempt to determine the legislative intent by interpreting the statute as a whole, cоnsidering its place in the relevant statutory scheme, as well as the statute‘s “subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” Harris, 234 Ariz. at 345, ¶ 13, 322 P.3d at 162 (internal citations omitted); see CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC, v. Loop 101, LLC, 233 Ariz. 355, 360-61, ¶ 14, 312 P.3d 1121, 1126-27 (App.2013).
¶ 11 A parent‘s rights may be terminated pursuant to
¶ 12 The juvenile сourt appears to have determined that the word “includes” in
¶ 13 We conclude the juvenile court erred in its construction of
¶ 14 Moreover, the juvenile court‘s construction of
¶ 15 We conclude that severance based on neglect or abuse under
¶ 16 Appellant also contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied the petition to terminate Father‘s parental rights pursuant to
¶ 17 Here, the only factor in dispute is whether Father “substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy” the circumstances causing E.R. to be removed from his home. This factor focuses on Father‘s “effort to cure the circumstances rather than [Father‘s] success in actually doing so,” and refers to the “circumstances” existing at the timе of the severance rather than the initial dependency petition. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep‘t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 329, 330 ¶¶ 20, 22, 152 P.3d 1209, 1212 (App. 2007).
¶ 18 Father‘s alleged abuse and neglect under
¶ 19 Finally, Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred by ordering DCS to redact certain reports before admitting them as exhibits at the severance trial. Appellant claims that it was prejudiced by this ruling because the redactions excluded important evidence regarding (1) Father‘s ability to parent E.R. and (2) Father‘s failure to remedy the circumstances that led E.R. to be in out-of-home placement. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, 232, ¶ 48, 159 P.3d 531, 542 (2007).
¶ 20 Based on the record before us, we find no error. Original copies of the redacted reports were not admitted at trial by the juvenile court, and Appellant does not specify what information was redacted. We note that all of the authors of the reports testified at trial and discussed the contents of their reports. As a result, we are unable to determine whether the redacted information was relevant, or whether Appellant suffered any prejudice.
CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the order denying the petition to tеrminate Father‘s parental rights as to E.R., and remand this matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
[u]nder circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical injury to a child ... any person who causes a child ... to suffer physical injury or abuse or, having the care or custody of a child ... who causes or permits the person or health of the child ... to be injurеd or who causes or permits a child ... to be placed in a situation where the person or health of the child ... is endangered is guilty [of child abuse.] ... If done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class 4 felony.