Adonai El-Shaddai v. Jeffrey Wang, Md, 833 F.3d 1036

Background

El-Shaddai is an incarcerated California prisoner who sued prison officials asserting deliberate indifference to medical needs.
Before this case he filed at least eleven federal suits; district court treated many as strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
District court concluded El-Shaddai had three or more strikes and denied IFP status, finding no imminent danger exception.
The court counted eleven potential strikes but ultimately held only one valid strike under the PLRA.
The court addressed four categories: denial of IFP, failure to exhaust, summary-judgment dismissals, and habeas petitions as potential strikes; some dismissals were not counted as strikes.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reverses, holding only one dismissal qualifies as a strike and remands for IFP determination

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prior dismissals qualify as PLRA strikes	El-Shaddai argues multiple prior dismissals were not strikes	Wang contends several cases were properly strikes under §1915(g)	Only one prior dismissal qualifies as a strike
Whether denial of IFP based on prior strikes counts as a strike	IFP denial solely due to prior strikes should not itself be a strike	IFP denial can be strike-worthy if grounded in frivolous/malicious/failure to state a claim	IFP-denial grounded only on prior-strikes does not count as an additional strike
Whether failures to exhaust administrative remedies constitute strikes	Failure to exhaust should be treated as an independent grounds for strike	Exhaustion failure can be a strike when it is a fully sufficient basis for dismissal	Failure-to-exhaust dismissals do not count as strikes unless they rest on enumerated grounds; Prunty I’s exhaustion-based dismissal did not count as a strike
Whether summary-judgment dismissals count as strikes	Summary judgments should count if based on frivolous/malicious/failure to state a claim	Some summary judgments don’t rely on those grounds and thus aren’t strikes	Summary-judgment dismissals do not count as strikes unless framed on grounds of frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim
Whether appellate affirmances count as strikes	Appellate affirmances should not be treated as strikes unless the appeal itself was frivolous	Appellate dispositions can count if explicitly frivolous or failing to state a claim	Appellate affirmances do not count as strikes unless the court expressly states the appeal was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim

Key Cases Cited

O'Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal predicated on denial of IFP may be strike-worthy when based on enumerated grounds)
Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (examines proper counting of PLRA strikes)
Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607 (4th Cir. 2013) (discusses when a summary-judgment dismissal can count as a strike)
Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013) (counts or excludes strikes based on disposition grounds)
Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (limits and interpretation of § 1915(g) strikes)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (explanation of exhaustion and Rule 12(b)(6) interplay)
Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2015) (supports non-strike disposition for certain dispositions)
Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (guides when appellate disposition indicates lack of good faith)
Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1996) (mandamus context for civil vs. criminal nature of petitions)
Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc framework for exhaustion and PLRA)