Adnan Shroff v. Jefferson Sessions, III
890 F.3d 542
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- Adnan Shroff, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Texas (June 2016) to online solicitation of a minor under Tex. Penal Code § 33.021(c) and received deferred adjudication with community supervision.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings, alleging the conviction was an aggravated felony as "sexual abuse of a minor" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
- The BIA concluded the offense (1) involved a minor, (2) was sexual, and (3) was abusive, and affirmed removability under this court’s precedent treating a minor as anyone under 18.
- Shroff argued Esquivel-Quintana abrogated the court’s prior age-based definition and that his conviction did not qualify because the sting operation involved police posing as a 15-year-old.
- The Fifth Circuit applied the categorical approach and held Esquivel-Quintana requires the generic offense to cover only victims under 16 (or a defendant’s belief the victim is under 16), rendering Texas § 33.021(c) overbroad as drafted.
- The Fifth Circuit granted review, reversed the BIA, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s holding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conviction under Tex. Penal Code § 33.021(c) is an "aggravated felony" sexual abuse of a minor | Shroff: Esquivel-Quintana limits "minor" to under 16, so § 33.021(c) (which defines minor as under 17) is overbroad and does not categorically match the federal offense | Government: Esquivel-Quintana is limited to statutory-rape statutes criminalizing intercourse based solely on age and does not affect online solicitation; prior Fifth Circuit definition (under 18) remains controlling | Held: Esquivel-Quintana’s reasoning applies; generic "minor" is under 16 (or believed to be), so § 33.021(c) is overbroad and does not categorically constitute sexual abuse of a minor for removability |
| Whether sexual contact requirement abrogated by Esquivel-Quintana | Shroff: Implicitly argued the decision changes the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor | Government: Esquivel-Quintana did not address whether physical contact is required; prior precedents allowing noncontact sexual abuse remain valid | Held: Esquivel-Quintana did not abrogate the holding that sexual abuse can occur without physical contact; only the age threshold was altered |
| Relevance of sting/entrapment facts to categorical analysis | Shroff: No actual minor involved because it was a police sting | Government: Conviction via sting can still amount to attempt/sexual abuse for INA purposes; defendant’s belief can suffice | Held: Sting operation facts irrelevant to categorical inquiry; belief-based prong remains relevant but age threshold controls |
| Whether court retains jurisdiction to review legal classification | Shroff: Sought review of legal question whether conviction is an aggravated felony | Government: INA limits jurisdiction over removal orders for aggravated felonies but allows review of legal questions | Held: Court has jurisdiction to review pure legal questions about whether a conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony |
Key Cases Cited
- Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (interprets "minor" age threshold for sexual-abuse-of-a-minor aggravated-felony analysis)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach governs whether state offense matches federal aggravated-felony definition)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (previous Fifth Circuit defined minor as under 18)
- Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2014) (held sexual abuse can be noncontact and still abusive)
- United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2008) (applies categorical approach to sexual-abuse-of-a-minor analysis)