Adkins v. CP/IPERS Arlington Hotel (Show Cause Order), 799 S.E.2d 929

Dora L. Adkins is a pro se litigant who, since 2009, filed numerous civil actions in Northern Virginia and 27 petitions for appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, many alleging nearly identical hotel- and service-related injuries and conspiracies.
In the underlying circuit-court action Adkins sued CP/IPERS Arlington Hotel, LLC for breach of contract and gross negligence based on alleged unsanitary conditions, chemical exposure, unauthorized entry, and related injuries; the trial court sustained a demurrer to her second amended complaint with prejudice.
The Supreme Court refused her appeal and denied rehearing; the Court then issued a Rule to Show Cause whether Adkins should be barred from filing future pro se pleadings without leave of court.
The Court summarized Adkins’ pattern of vexatious, duplicative, and frivolous filings (41 circuit cases, repeated petitions for appeal and rehearing), and noted she persisted despite repeated dismissals.
The Court applied a multi-factor test (from Cromer and other authorities) weighing: litigation history, good-faith basis, burden on courts/parties, and adequacy of alternative sanctions.
Holding: the Court denied rehearing and entered a narrowly tailored pre-filing injunction — Adkins may not file any petition, motion, pleading, or other filing in the Supreme Court of Virginia without either (1) retaining a Virginia attorney or (2) obtaining leave of the Court to file pro se.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether to impose a pre-filing injunction in the Supreme Court of Virginia	Adkins argued she should remain able to file pro se; attributed prolific filings to divine intervention and insisted her claims are real	CP/IPERS (and record) argued Adkins has a long history of frivolous, duplicative suits that harass defendants and waste judicial resources	Court imposed a pre-filing injunction requiring either counsel or leave to file pro se in this Court
Whether pro se litigants are subject to Code § 8.01-271.1 good-faith pleading requirement	Adkins implicitly contested restrictions on her filings	Opposing parties relied on the statute and precedent to show pro se litigants are accountable	Court affirmed the statute’s applicability to pro se litigants and cited precedent holding pro se must meet good-faith standards
Whether alternative sanctions (e.g., monetary) are adequate	Adkins did not identify effective, non-restrictive remedies	Respondents argued monetary sanctions would not stop future filings and would still impose burdens	Court found monetary sanctions inadequate to prevent continued frivolous filings and harassment
Scope and tailoring of the injunction	Adkins sought continued unfettered access to file pro se	Respondents sought a pre-filing leave requirement or other restriction	Court applied Cromer factors and narrowly tailored relief: counsel required or leave of Court for any future filings in the Supreme Court of Virginia

Shipe v. Hunter, 280 Va. 480, 699 S.E.2d 519 (2010) (pro se litigants are held to good-faith pleading standards)
Switzer v. Switzer, 273 Va. 326, 641 S.E.2d 80 (2007) (discussing leave-of-court prefiling restrictions for repeated frivolous appeals)
Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812 (4th Cir. 2004) (articulating four-factor test for prefiling injunctions and requiring narrow tailoring)
In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 (1991) (courts’ inherent authority to protect jurisdiction from abusive filings)
In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (limited judicial resources justify control over repetitious or frivolous filings)
Toghill v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 220, 768 S.E.2d 674 (2015) (state court may consider federal authority as persuasive when addressing prefiling restrictions)