Lead Opinion
Pro se petitioner Michael Sindram seeks an extraordinary-writ pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1651 and requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 39. This is petitioner’s 25th filing before this Court in the October 1990 Term alone. Pursuant to our decision in In re McDonald,
Petitioner is no stranger to this Court. In the last three years, he has filed 43 separate petitions and motions, includ
The mandamus petition alleges only that petitioner’s “appeal in the lower court remains pending and unacted upon,” and that “[a]s a direct and proximate cause оf this dilatory action, Petitioner is unable to have his driving record expunged.” Pet. for Mandamus 2. The legal bases offered by petitioner for relief were presented in eight prior certiorari petitions and are identical to the claims unsuccessfully presented in at least 13 of petitioner’s rehearing petitions.
As we made clear in McDonald, the granting of an extraordinary writ is, in itsеlf, extraordinary.
In McDonald, supra, we denied in forma pauperis status to a petitioner who filed a similarly nugatory petition for extraordinary writ. As we explained, the Court waives filing fеes and costs for indigent individuals in order to promote the interests of justice. The goal of fairly dispensing justice, however, is compromised when the Court is forced to devote
Accordingly, if petitioner wishes to have his petition considered on its merits, he must pay the docketing fee required by this Court’s Rule 38(a) and submit a pеtition in compliance with Rule 33 before January 28, 1991. The Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions from petitioner for extraordinary writs pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1651(a), 2241, and 2254(a), unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33. Petitioner remains free under the present order to file in forma pauperis requests for. relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he qualifies under this Court’s Rule 39 and does not similarly abuse that privilege.
It is so ordered.
Notes
See Sindram v. Reading, No. 87-5734, cert. denied,
We have permitted petitioner to proceed informa pauperis in each of these actions based upon his affidavit that he earns only $2,600 per year and has no assets of any value.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
To rid itself of the minor inconvenience cаused by Michael Sindram, an in forma pauperis litigant, the Court closes its doors to future in forma pauperis filings by Sindram for extraordinary writs and hints that restrictions on other filings
As the Court documents, Sindram’s filings have bеen numerous, and many have been frivolous. In my view, however, the Court’s worries about the threats that hyperactive informa pauperis litigants like Sindram pose to our ability to manage our dockеt are greatly exaggerated and do not support the penalty that the Court imposes upon him. We receive countless frivolous informa pauperis filings each year, and, as a practical matter, we identify and dispense with them with ease. Moreover, indigent litigants hardly corner the market on frivolous filings. We receive a fair share of frivolous filings from paying litigants. Indeed, I suspect that because clever attorneys manage to package these filings so their lack of merit is not immediately apparent, we expend mоre time wading through frivolous paid filings than through frivolous in forma pauperis filings. To single out Sindram in response to a problem that cuts across all classes of litigants strikes me as unfair, discriminatory, and petty.
The Court’s crackdown on Sindram’s future filings for extraordinary writs is additionally disconcerting when one considers the total absence of any authority for the penalty the Court administers. As Justice Brennan keenly pointed out in In re McDonald, see id., at 185-186, the in forma pauperis statute permits courts only to dismiss an action that is in fact frivolous. See 28 U. S. C. § 1915(d). That statute, however, does not authorize us prospectively to bar an informa pauperis filing on the ground that the litigant’s earlier filings in unrelated actions were frivolous. This Court’s Rules are equally silent on the matter. Rule 39, which governs in forma pauperis proceedings, includes no provisiоn allowing prospective denial of informa pauperis status. While Rule
Some of our in forma pauperis filings are made by destitute or emotionally troubled individuals. As we struggle to resolve vexing legal issues of our day, it is tempting to feel put upon by prolific litigants who temporarily divert our attention from these issues. In my view, however, the minimal annoyance these litigants might cause is well worth the cost. Our longstanding tradition of leaving our door open to all classes of litigants is a prоud and decent one worth maintaining. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
Moreover, we should not presume in advance that prolific indigent litigants will never bring a meritorious claim. Nor should we lose sight of the important role informa pauperis claims have played in shaping constitutional doctrine. See, e. g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
I dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I join Justice Marshall’s dissent. I write separately simply to emphasize what seems to me to be the inappropriateness of the Court’s action in this particular case. Even if one believes, as I do nоt, that this Court has the authority prospectively to deny leave for a litigant to proceed informa pauperis, and in some instances may be justified in doing so,
While it may well be true that each of Sindram’s petitions for extraordinary relief lacked merit, it cannot be, as the Court asserts, that these two рetitions have “compromised]” the “goal of fairly dispensing justice,” or “disrupted] the fair allocation of judicial resources.” Ante, at 179-180. Rather, the Court’s order in this case appears to be nothing more than an alternative for punishing Sindram for the frequency with which he has filed petitions for certiorari and petitions for rehearing. Ante, at 177-178. Accordingly, I dissent.