Adeeko v. Garland, 3 F.4th 741

Petitioner Seyi Muyiwa Adeeko, a Nigerian national and U.S. lawful permanent resident (since 2013), pled guilty in Texas in 2017 to online solicitation of a minor (Tex. Penal Code § 33.021(c)) and received ten years’ community supervision and a fine.
DHS charged Adeeko removable under multiple grounds, including 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as an alien convicted of a “crime of child abuse,” and initially alleged other charges later withdrawn.
At first an IJ terminated proceedings, reasoning § 33.021(c) did not necessarily require an actual minor victim; the BIA partially vacated, concluding the conviction fit the BIA’s broad definition of child abuse and remanded.
Adeeko sought reconsideration arguing (inter alia) that Esquivel-Quintana limited the relevant age concept and that the BIA’s child-abuse definition was unreasonable; the BIA denied reconsideration.
On remand the IJ ordered removal; Adeeko filed a petition for review (initially in the Tenth Circuit, which transferred the case to the Fifth because the IJ sat in Texas).
The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo whether § 33.021(c) is a categorical match to the BIA’s definition of a crime of child abuse and whether Chevron deference and the rule of lenity applied.

Issue	Adeeko's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Venue / reviewability (Chenery)	BIA relied on Tenth Circuit law; Chenery precludes this court from affirming on other grounds and case should be heard in Tenth Circuit	Venue proper in Fifth (IJ sat in Texas); no prejudice; Fifth may review de novo	Fifth has jurisdiction; transfer denied; review permitted
Deference to BIA’s definition (Chevron)	BIA’s broad definition not entitled to Chevron; apply plain-meaning (Rodriguez)	Garcia controls: BIA’s reading of “crime of child abuse” is reasonable and gets Chevron deference	Court follows Garcia; Chevron deference applied
Categorical match: § 33.021(c) vs. generic "crime of child abuse"	§ 33.021(c) is broader (e.g., actor need only believe victim is <17; no explicit likelihood-of-harm element) and thus not a categorical match	§ 33.021(c) requires knowing solicitation of illegal sexual acts of a minor and meets the BIA’s broad definition (includes endangerment/sexual exploitation)	§ 33.021(c) categorically fits the BIA’s definition; conviction renders petitioner removable
Rule of lenity	Statute ambiguous; interpret in petitioner’s favor	Chevron deference resolves ambiguity; lenity not triggered	Rule of lenity does not apply

Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 2020) (BIA’s broad definition of "crime of child abuse" entitled to Chevron deference)
Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (interpreting age/consent issue in federal "sexual abuse of a minor" context)
Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015) (categorical approach applies in immigration removal analyses)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical-match framework; presume conviction rests on least conduct criminalized)
Vetcher v. Barr, 953 F.3d 361 (5th Cir.) (discussing categorical-match standard in removal context)
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (courts review agency decisions only on the grounds the agency invoked)
United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2013) (argued by petitioner for plain-meaning approach to non–common-law offenses)