Adams v. District of Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 392

Plaintiff suffered a stroke in May 2005 while employed as a Technology Specialist with the DC Department of Mental Health.
Plaintiff requested permission to work from home, but no accommodation was arranged by September 2005.
Plaintiff filed EEO and related complaints; on February 5, 2006 the Department informed him it could not grant accommodation.
DCOHR determined probable cause in January 2008 that a reasonable accommodation was not provided, and mediation continued until August 2008.
DCOHR ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice on October 20, 2009; plaintiff then filed suit in DC Superior Court, which was removed here.
The court previously dismissed the DC HRA claim and the Rehabilitation Act disparate-treatment claim; plaintiff seeks reconsideration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal of the DCHRA claim was proper	Plaintiff argues Anderson requires withdrawal timing to preserve court remedy.	District asserts Anderson supports dismissal when probable-cause determinations occur before withdrawal.	DCHRA claim properly dismissed under Anderson.
Whether exhaustion tolling applies to Rehabilitation Act claim	Plaintiff contends lack of exhaustion should be tolled due to unsettled law and reliance on contrary authority.	Defendant contends no exhaustion required and no tolling occurred.	Rehabilitation Act claim time-barred; no tolling and no exhaustion required.

Anderson v. U.S. Safe Deposit Co., 552 A.2d 859 (D.C.1989) (withdrawal must occur before DCOHR disposition to preserve judicial action)
Carter v. District of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217 (D.C.2009) (DCHRA forum choice; jurisdiction mutual exclusivity of court and OHR)
Brown v. Capitol Hill Club, 425 A.2d 1309 (D.C.1981) (withdrawal timing requirement for preserving judicial remedy)
Weiss v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 729 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C.1990) (treats controlling authority on HRA interpretation)