Adam Locke v. Mya Haessig
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9436
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Locke, a male parolee supervised 2007–2009, alleged sexual harassment by parole agent Anthony Flores (propositions, unwanted advances, offer to remove electronic monitor for nude photos).
- Locke complained to his primary agent, Wendy Schwartz; Schwartz informed supervisor Mya Haessig, who reported the complaint to regional office and was directed to obtain a written statement.
- According to Locke (accepted for this interlocutory appeal), neither Haessig nor Schwartz followed up; Haessig took no investigative steps, made no file entry, and did not transfer Locke away from Flores.
- Locke alleges Haessig became hostile after the complaint and told him he would remain on his ankle monitor until parole discharge (an asserted retaliatory threat).
- The district court denied Haessig qualified-immunity summary judgment on Locke’s Equal Protection claim; this interlocutory appeal asks whether, as a matter of law, Locke’s version of facts could show discriminatory intent sufficient to defeat qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Haessig had the requisite intent to discriminate for supervisory liability under the Equal Protection Clause | Locke: Haessig’s failure to investigate/intervene plus her retaliatory threat permits a jury to infer intentional sex-based discrimination | Haessig: Mere inaction (failure to intervene) cannot show the specific intent Iqbal requires for supervisory liability | Court: A jury could infer discriminatory intent from the combination of inaction and retaliatory threat; denial of qualified immunity affirmed |
| Whether Locke’s claimed right was clearly established in 2007–2008 | Locke: Pre-2009 precedent made it clearly established that supervisors can be liable for sexual-harassment-related equal-protection violations when they consciously fail to protect or retaliate | Haessig: Unclear after later doctrinal developments (Iqbal) | Court: Law was clearly established in 2007–2008; supervisors could be liable for intentional discrimination or conscious failures to protect, so Haessig had notice her conduct could be unlawful |
| Whether Iqbal forecloses supervisory liability for inaction (distinguishing action vs. inaction) | Locke: Iqbal does not categorically bar inferring intent from selective inaction combined with retaliatory conduct | Haessig: Post-Iqbal, supervisory liability requires purposeful action; nonaction cannot establish intent as a matter of law | Court: Rejected bright-line action/inaction distinction; selective inaction and especially retaliation can support an inference of discriminatory intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2006) (supervisor’s inadequate response to harassment could permit jury inference of intentional discrimination)
- Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986) (sexual harassment actionable under Equal Protection; supervisor liability where conscious failure to protect amounts to intentional discrimination)
- Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (officials’ differential responses to harassment complaints by males vs. females supported equal-protection claim)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (supervisory liability requires showing the supervisor’s own purposeful discriminatory intent)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (retaliation in response to an allegation of sex discrimination is itself discrimination)
- T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2010) (post-Iqbal, jury could infer discriminatory intent from evidence a principal covered up sexual abuse and mischaracterized complaints)
- Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988) (supervisory liability not based on respondeat superior; supervisors must know and facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind eye)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework: whether right violated and whether it was clearly established)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity protects officials unless conduct violates clearly established law)