Action Committee for Transit, Inc. v. Town of Chevy Chase
145 A.3d 640
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2016Background
- ACT (a nonprofit transit advocacy group) and Benjamin Ross (author/blogger) submitted multiple Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA) requests to the Town of Chevy Chase for records about the Town’s retention of outside law, lobbying, and PR firms concerning opposition to the Purple Line.
- ACT and Ross sought fee waivers under GP § 4-206(e)(2), alleging public-interest purposes and inability to pay; Ross also claimed media status. The Town repeatedly denied fee waivers and declined to provide the statutory first two hours of free search for some requests.
- The Town’s written denials were terse; in litigation the Town argued (in its memorandum) that it denied waivers in part because ACT and Ross had previously criticized the Town and might be seeking the records to retaliate rather than for a public purpose.
- ACT and Ross sued in Montgomery County Circuit Court challenging the denials (and other related denials), seeking disclosure, fee waivers, and attorneys’ fees; the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Town.
- On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on the fee-waiver issue, holding the Town’s denial was arbitrary and capricious where the decision relied on applicants’ past critical speech without sufficient explanation or record support; the court remanded for further proceedings and directed the Town to respond to ACT’s and Ross’s requests without charge while leaving the closed-meeting minutes ruling intact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Town lawfully denied ACT’s fee-waiver request under GP § 4-206(e)(2) | ACT: Town’s denial was legally deficient and arbitrary because the Town gave no stated factors and relied on ACT’s prior criticisms | Town: Denial was proper; it considered the requester’s identity/purpose and reasonable factors (including past statements) and need not enumerate factors in denial letters | Court: Denial arbitrary and capricious; Town relied on applicants’ past critical speech (viewpoint) and failed to show consideration of appropriate "other relevant factors"; remand required |
| Whether the Town lawfully denied Ross’s fee-waiver request (media claim) | Ross: He is a member of the media and sought records in public interest; denial based solely on association with ACT was improper | Town: Ross’s requests indicated he acted as ACT’s proxy and was not seeking in a media capacity, so denial was proper | Court: Because ACT denial was arbitrary and primary basis for Ross denial was his affiliation with ACT, Ross’s denial was also arbitrary and capricious; Ross qualifies as media for MPIA purposes |
| Whether the Town needed to list specific factors when denying fee waivers | ACT/Ross: Denials must identify the ‘other relevant factors’ considered to permit court review | Town: Statute does not require custodians to list factors; letters stating the request was considered suffice | Court: Custodian must consider ability to pay and other factors, and courts must be able to review the decision-making; conclusory denials without record of factors are insufficient |
| Whether reliance on past critical speech is a permissible factor | ACT/Ross: Denial based on prior criticism is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and impermissible factor | Town: May consider identity and purpose of requester; past comments are relevant to requester purpose | Court: Reliance on applicants’ past negative comments about the Town is unconstitutional viewpoint-based consideration and renders the denial arbitrary and capricious |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Burke, 67 Md. App. 147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (agency must consider "other relevant factors" and public-interest when denying MPIA fee waivers)
- Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (government may not impose financial burdens on speakers based on content/viewpoint)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (strict scrutiny for content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech)
- Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004) (viewpoint neutrality principle: state cannot suppress speech by burdening particular perspectives)