Ace Patterson v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3852
11th Cir.2017Background
- In 1998 Ace Patterson was convicted in Florida of burglary, aggravated kidnapping of a child, and two counts of capital sexual battery; the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment and chemical castration.
- Patterson filed state and federal collateral attacks; his first federal habeas petition (2006) was dismissed as untimely, effectively using his one federal opportunity under AEDPA to challenge the 1998 judgment.
- In 2009 Patterson moved under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) to correct an illegal sentence, arguing statutory prerequisites for chemical castration were not met; the State and the victim’s guardian ad litem consented.
- The Florida trial court granted the motion and ordered that Patterson not undergo chemical castration, but it did not vacate or replace the 1998 judgment, nor did it enter a new affirmative commitment directing the Department of Corrections.
- Patterson filed a second federal habeas petition in 2011 challenging his convictions; the district court dismissed it as second or successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The Eleventh Circuit (en banc) affirmed that dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2009 Rule 3.800(a) order that barred chemical castration constitutes a new “judgment” under § 2254 so the 2011 petition is not second or successive | Patterson: the 2009 order altered his sentence and therefore is a new judgment authorizing custody, allowing a new federal petition under Magwood | State: the only judgment authorizing custody remains the 1998 judgment; the 2009 order merely negated one punishment and did not authorize confinement or replace the original judgment | Held: No — the 2009 order is not a new judgment authorizing confinement; the 1998 judgment still authorizes custody, so the 2011 petition is second or successive and was properly dismissed |
| Whether changes to a sentence that do not alter custody nevertheless trigger a new round of federal habeas review | Patterson: any substantive change to sentence (even non-detrimental) is a new judgment for § 2244 purposes | State/Majority: AEDPA focuses on the judgment authorizing custody; not all ameliorative or noncustodial changes create a new judgment | Held: Changes that do not produce a new judgment authorizing custody do not permit a successive petition; the custody-authorizing judgment is the operative one |
| Applicability of Insignares precedent (where a Rule 3.800(a) correction produced a new judgment) | Patterson: Insignares controls because both cases involved Rule 3.800(a) corrections that removed part of an original sentence | State/Majority: Insignares is distinguishable — there the state court entered a new corrected sentence and judgment that committed the prisoner to custody; here no new judgment was entered | Held: Insignares does not control because no intervening judgment authorizing custody was entered in Patterson’s case |
| Policy concern whether treating all sentence changes as new judgments will discourage consensual corrections and moot victims’ interests | Patterson/Dissent: recognizing a new judgment when sentence changes substantively alters punishment and respects state law; warns that a narrow rule invites procedural gamesmanship | Majority: allowing any sentence change to reopen federal review would undermine AEDPA’s finality, discourage state concessions, and burden victims; rule should hinge on existence of a new judgment authorizing custody | Held: Majority adopts approach keyed to whether a new judgment authorizing confinement exists to avoid undermining finality and practical harms |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (a new judgment authorizing confinement permits a later habeas petition not to be ‘‘second or successive’')
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (habeas under § 2254 challenges the state-court judgment pursuant to which petitioner is in custody)
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (second petition bar applies to multiple challenges to the same underlying judgment)
- Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (AEDPA’s successive-petition rules reflect respect for finality of criminal judgments)
- Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (corrected sentence that resulted in a new judgment authorized a subsequent habeas petition)
- United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (correction of clerical sentencing errors does not necessarily create a new judgment for appellate timing)
- Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (discussing finality in criminal judgments and its system-wide importance)