648 S.W.3d 178
Tenn. Crim. App.2020Background
- Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman (convicted in late 1980s of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and related offenses) was sentenced to death; his direct and federal collateral appeals were unsuccessful.
- In 2016 he moved to reopen post-conviction proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117 based on Foster v. Chatman and newly obtained prosecutor jury-selection notes alleging race-based strikes.
- The post-conviction court set an evidentiary hearing; at that hearing the District Attorney General agreed to an Agreed Order (AO) that converted Petitioner’s death sentence to life imprisonment in exchange for Petitioner’s waiver and dismissal of post-conviction claims.
- The post-conviction court signed the AO and entered an amended judgment reflecting life imprisonment; the State (via the Attorney General and Reporter) then appealed the AO and amended judgment.
- The State argued the post-conviction court lacked jurisdiction to accept the AO and amend a final judgment because it did not make the statutory findings required by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act; Petitioner argued the State had consented and waived appeal rights and that the court had jurisdiction.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals held the State may appeal despite the District Attorney’s in-court consent, and that the post-conviction court lacked authority to amend the final judgment by agreement without first finding entitlement to relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act; it vacated the AO and amended judgment and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Petitioner’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State may appeal the AO despite the District Attorney General’s consent | DA’s consent in trial court forecloses State appeal; AO is a settlement the parties cannot appeal | State AG has the right to appeal under Rule 3(c) (appeal from final post-conviction judgments) and may challenge jurisdiction | State may appeal; AG had authority to bring the appeal; jurisdictional challenge not waived |
| Whether the post-conviction court properly granted the motion to reopen under § 40-30-117 | Reopening was proper; court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Foster claim and hold hearing | Court failed to make required statutory findings when granting reopen; thus no basis to settle | Court had authority to consider motion to reopen and hold a hearing; grant itself was not the jurisdictional defect contested on appeal |
| Whether the post-conviction court could accept an agreed order that amends a final criminal judgment absent a statutory finding of entitlement to relief | Court may accept equitable settlement and amend sentence by agreement of parties and court approval | Post-conviction court may only amend a final judgment after finding the conviction or sentence is void or voidable under the Act; agreement alone cannot confer jurisdiction to alter a final judgment | Post-conviction court lacked jurisdiction to amend the final judgment by AO where it did not find a constitutional violation; AO and amended judgment vacated |
| Whether the State Attorney General can challenge an agreement entered by the District Attorney General | DA’s trial-level concessions bind the State and AG should not second-guess trial prosecutor settlements | State AG has exclusive appellate authority; may take a different position on appeal and may challenge court jurisdiction | State AG may appeal; the allocation of trial versus appellate authority allows AG to challenge jurisdiction despite trial-level consent |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes)
- Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (addressing use of prosecutor notes to demonstrate discriminatory intent in strikes)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (standard for showing discriminatory intent in juror strikes)
- Boyd v. State, 51 S.W.3d 206 (post-conviction court cannot amend final judgment by agreement without following statutory procedure)
- State v. Allen, 593 S.W.3d 145 (Rule 36 limits on amending final judgments; appellate relief when court exceeds Rule 36 authority)
- Workman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 807 (separation of powers concerns; trial court cannot exercise pardon/commutation power)
- Cawood v. State, 134 S.W.3d 159 (subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute; de novo review)
- Pacific R.R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289 (consent does not necessarily strip appellate courts of jurisdiction to consider jurisdictional defects)
- Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632 (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived)