Abraham Saldivar v. Jefferson Sessions, 877 F.3d 812

Background

Saldivar, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. in 1993 as a child after an immigration officer "waved him through" at the San Ysidro port of entry. He later adjusted to LPR in 2006.
He was convicted in California in 2012 for possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia and DHS served a Notice to Appear charging removability.
Saldivar applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a); eligibility requires seven years of continuous residence after being "admitted in any status."
The IJ and a single-member BIA decision held Saldivar ineligible, reasoning a procedurally regular but "mistaken" admission (wave-through) does not amount to admission "in any status."
The Ninth Circuit (majority) assumed Saldivar was waved through in 1993, held that procedural admission qualifies as an admission and that the phrase "in any status" unambiguously includes lawful and unlawful status, and granted the petition, vacating and remanding.

Issues

Issue	Saldivar's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether being waved through at a port of entry in 1993 constitutes an "admission"	Wave-through is a procedurally regular admission (inspection + authorization) and thus counts as an "admission."	Even if waved through, that does not confer any cognizable immigration status for § 1229b(a)(2).	Court: Wave-through is an "admission" under the procedural definition in § 1101(a)(13)(A).
Whether an admission "in any status" includes unlawful (non‑citizen) status	"Any status" is plain and expansive; it covers all immigration states or conditions, lawful or unlawful.	"Any status" should mean only lawful classifications; Congress would have said so if it meant unlawful status to count.	Court: "Any status" unambiguously includes lawful and unlawful status; no Chevron deference to BIA required.
Whether BIA's published precedent and deference (Chevron/Skidmore) control	BIA's contrary unpublished decision is unpersuasive; the statute is unambiguous so Chevron doesn't apply.	Defer to the BIA's interpretation under Chevron; Blancas-Lara supports limiting "status" to recognized classifications.	Court: Statute unambiguous; even if ambiguous, BIA decision here is not persuasive and not entitled to Chevron.
Whether prior Ninth Circuit precedents (e.g., Lai Haw Wong, Vasquez) require excluding wave‑throughs or unlawful status	Precedents distinguish entries without inspection or situations where no admission occurred; they do not control where a procedural admission occurred.	Cases like Lai Haw Wong show "mistaken admission" confers no status; Vasquez suggests accrual begins on admission to LPR.	Court: Distinguishes those cases—where there was no admission, § 1229b(a)(2) does not apply; here procedural admission suffices and continuous residence may run from that admission.

Key Cases Cited

Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (procedural inspection/authorization defines "admission")
Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016) (statutory interpretation—unambiguous INA language controls)
Tula-Rubio v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2015) ("any status" construed to include various admissions; supports inclusive reading)
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (U.S. 2015) (agency interpretations that make scant sense are not owed Chevron deference)
Lai Haw Wong v. INS, 474 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (mistaken admission did not confer lawful status for certain relief)
Vasquez de Alcantar v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing entries without inspection; no admission when never inspected)
Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing deference and when agency precedent governs)
Guevara v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2011) (employment authorization does not constitute admission in any status)