Abecassis v. Wyatt
7 F. Supp. 3d 668
S.D. Tex.2014Background
- Plaintiffs allege violations of the Anti-Terrorism Act for off-Book kickbacks to Saddam Hussein’s regime used to fund terrorism.
- Plaintiffs are U.S. citizens or family members of victims of Israeli terrorist attacks in 2001–2002, seeking treble damages.
- First amended complaint claims defendants provided material support and engaged in unlawful financial transactions with Iraq during Hussein’s rule.
- Court had previously dismissed some ATA claims but allowed amendment, applying scienter and causation standards from Abecassis v. Wyatt; law-of-the-case concerns were raised on reconsideration.
- Court denies the motions in part and grants in part; it preserves primary liability theories while dismissing aiding-and-abetting claims under the civil ATA; the 2332(d) and related statutes’ knowledge and proximate-causation standards remain intact.
- Court treats Rule 12(c) as proper vehicle for reconsideration and finds substantial alignment with prior rulings and subsequent case law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is aiding and abetting liability available under the civil ATA? | Abecassis assumed such liability could exist; plaintiffs alleged secondary liability. | Rothstein and Boim hold aiding and abetting is not available under the civil ATA. | Aiding and abetting not available; claims dismissed. |
| Have plaintiffs pled sufficient causation and knowledge under the ATA to state a claim? | Facts show kickbacks funded terrorism and caused injuries; knowledge of aiding terrorism. | Standards from Rothstein/Recent cases require careful causal connection and knowledge. | Claims pled with sufficient causation and knowledge; allowed to proceed on primary liability. |
| Do the post-Rothstein cases change the proximate-causation standard for ATA claims? | Cases like Strauss/Stansell support plaintiff theories of causation under the ATA. | Rothstein heightens or clarifies causation requirements. | No material alteration; standards remain consistent with prior ruling. |
| Should El Paso be held liable via respondeat superior based on Wyatt’s agency? | Wyatt’s actions within agency scope imply El Paso liability. | Respondeat superior theory remains viable; no new grounds. | Respondeat superior liability for El Paso preserved; no denial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (aiding and abetting not available under civil ATA; statutory silence plus Boim framework)
- In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (aiding and abetting not available under civil ATA; proximate causation standard applied)
- Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1994) (no general presumption of aiding and abetting liability when statute is silent)