Abdul Jaludi v. Citigroup, 57 F.4th 148

Jaludi worked at Citigroup, reported company wrongdoing, was demoted, transferred, and fired in 2013; he alleges Citigroup blacklisted him thereafter.
In 2015 he sued Citigroup under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and RICO; the District Court directed arbitration and the Third Circuit reversed as to SOX claims, remanding them to court.
While his arbitration appeal was pending, Jaludi filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor in early 2018, alleging among other things that a 2017 headhunter stopped responding to him (which he attributed to blacklisting).
On remand the District Court dismissed his SOX claims as time-barred because SOX requires filing an administrative complaint within 180 days of the retaliatory act and Jaludi’s administrative complaint was filed more than two years after the last alleged incident.
On appeal the central disputes were (1) whether SOX’s 180-day statute and its exhaustion requirement are jurisdictional, and (2) whether the complaint could be saved by amendment adding the 2017 headhunter allegation.
The Third Circuit held neither procedural requirement is jurisdictional, but affirmed dismissal on the merits because the administrative complaint was untimely and amendment would be futile; dismissal was with prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether SOX’s 180‑day filing requirement is jurisdictional	Jaludi implied it should not bar his suit if construed permissively	Citigroup argued timeliness is fatal to the suit and should bar relief	The 180‑day limit is nonjurisdictional; it does not deprive courts of subject‑matter jurisdiction
Whether SOX’s administrative‑exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional	Jaludi argued exhaustion is not jurisdictional and can be excused	Citigroup argued failure to exhaust before suing deprives courts of jurisdiction	Exhaustion is nonjurisdictional under SOX; the statute does not clearly assign jurisdictional effect to exhaustion
Whether Jaludi’s administrative complaint was timely	Jaludi contended the 2017 headhunter silence in his admin complaint made the filing timely	Citigroup maintained the administrative complaint was filed after the 180‑day window and is untimely	The administrative complaint was untimely (filed more than 180 days after the relevant conduct), so the suit is time‑barred
Whether leave to amend to add the 2017 allegation should be permitted	Jaludi sought leave to amend to add the timely 2017 headhunter allegation	Citigroup opposed, arguing the new allegation is implausible and unrelated to protected activity	Amendment would be futile because the added allegation was implausible and failed to show a contributing causal connection; leave denied

Boechler P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022) (clarifies when procedural bars are jurisdictional and demands a clear statement from Congress)
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015) (uses statutory context to determine whether a procedural rule is jurisdictional)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (distinguishes jurisdictional requirements from elements of a claim)
Guerra v. Consol. Rail Corp., 936 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2019) (treated a similar time limit as nonjurisdictional)
Daly v. Citigroup Inc., 939 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2019) (contrasting Second Circuit decision treating exhaustion more restrictively)
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (statutory time limits need not speak in jurisdictional terms to be nonjurisdictional)
Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019) (procedural failures often lead to dismissal even if nonjurisdictional)
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (last‑antecedent canon and parsing statutes)
Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 812 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2016) (contributing‑factor causation standard under SOX)
In re Digital Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004) (denial of leave to amend where amendment would be futile)