Abbey v. United States
106 Fed. Cl. 254
| Fed. Cl. | 2012Background
- Plaintiffs allege FAA violated the FLSA by improperly calculating overtime and by paying compensatory time/credit hours instead of cash overtime.
- Abbey I (2008) held compensatory time/credit hours violated the FLSA’s overtime requirement; Abbey II (2011) addressed regular-rate determinations and pre/post-shift activities.
- This damages phase followed liability rulings; trial occurred March 5–7, 2012 in DC to resolve back pay, willfulness, and good-faith liquidated damages issues.
- FAA PMS (1996) decision-making process determined that Title 5 provisions could be adopted by the FAA, affecting compensatory time/credit hours policy; no comprehensive written legal analysis accompanied the PMSDocument.
- Credit hours and compensatory time are tracked in FAA timekeeping systems; compensatory time has expiration rules and is paid out upon expiration or separation; credit hours generally have no cash value except under specific 2006/1998 CBAs.
- Court seeks to quantify back pay using a D’Camera/Abramson framework, with offset for hours already compensated, and to determine if liquidated damages should apply and whether the statute of limitations should be extended.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How should back‑pay damages be calculated? | Lanier’s Scenario One best reflects damages. | Scenarios should offset prepaid hours and reward only net damages; FIFO may misstate prestatutory hours. | Scenario One with an offset for hours earned and used is appropriate; Scenario Three inappropriate. |
| May FAA offset compensatory time/credit hours used against back pay? | Plaintiffs should be compensated for all hours earned; offsets should be limited. | Government may offset for hours used since FAA already paid for them. | FAA entitled to offset for compensatory time and credit hours earned and used; damages limited accordingly. |
| Are pre-statutory period hours recoverable given the statute of limitations? | Equitable tolling or broader recovery should apply to pre-period hours. | Prestatutory hours barred by two-year (or three-year for willful) limits. | No damages for pre-statutory hours absent tolling evidence; recovery limited to statutory period. |
| Was FAA's conduct willful or in bad faith, justifying extended limitations or non-liquidated damages? | FAA acted willfully by failing to analyze FLSA obligations in PMS; bad faith. | Actions were reasonable or at least not willful; relied on internal analysis and policy choices. | No willful violation; no three-year extension of the statute of limitations; liquidated damages awarded due to lack of good faith. |
| Should plaintiffs receive liquidated damages given lack of good faith? | Federal courts presume liquidated damages; FAA failed to show good faith. | FAA acted in good faith with reasonable grounds; thus liquidated damages may be limited. | Plaintiffs entitled to liquidated damages because FAA failed to show good faith and reasonable grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- D’Camera v. District of Columbia, 722 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1989) (adopted method for calculating FLSA damages in compensatory time cases)
- Abramson v. United States, 42 Fed.Cl. 326 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (uses D’Camera baseline for back-pay damages under Kiess Act)
- Abbey v. United States (Abbey I), 82 Fed.Cl. 722 (Fed.Cl. 2008) (liability finding on compensatory time/credit hours)
- Abbey v. United States (Abbey II), 99 Fed.Cl. 430 (Fed.Cl. 2011) (regular-rate determinations and related issues)
- Beebe v. United States, 226 Ct.Cl. 308 (Ct.Cl. 1981) (good-faith/intent standard for FLSA actions against government)
- McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1988) (willfulness standard for FLSA violations)
- Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1990) (equitable tolling presumption for suits against the U.S.)