Abarzua v. Colvin
1:16-cv-07594
S.D.N.Y.Jan 11, 2018Background
- Abarzua applied for Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits on July 10, 2010; after initial denial and remand, an ALJ again denied benefits on April 7, 2015; Appeals Council denied review and this action followed.
- Abarzua alleged numerous physical (spine, right-knee ACL/meniscus, carpal tunnel, obesity, hypertension, hepatitis C, vertigo, hearing loss, diabetes) and mental (depression, bipolar, anxiety, PTSD, substance dependence) impairments for the period July 10, 2010–April 7, 2015.
- Medical record included consultative exams (Drs. Lathan, Bougakov, Ha), treating providers (Drs. Batista, Khasidy, Hecht, Elbaz, PA Rosenberg), MRIs showing multilevel lumbar bulges and mild cervical bulge, and varied functional opinions ranging from marked work limitations to ability to perform low‑stress, simple work.
- ALJ found several severe impairments but no listing-level impairment, and assessed an RFC for reduced sedentary work: occasional lifting up to 10 lbs, sitting ~6 hours/day, standing/walking ~2 hours/day, limited to routine repetitive low‑stress tasks with occasional coworker/public contact.
- ALJ gave substantial/ significant weight to several non‑treating consultative and agency reviewers and little weight to several treating clinicians who opined inability to work; vocational expert identified sedentary jobs consistent with the RFC.
- District Court affirmed: held ALJ’s weighing of treating opinions satisfied the treating‑physician framework, RFC supported by substantial evidence, and step‑five vocational finding proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ violated the treating‑physician rule by not giving controlling weight to treating providers | Abarzua: ALJ ignored treating physicians (Batista, Khasidy, Hecht, Elbaz, Rosenberg) and improperly favored one‑time examiners and non‑treating reviewers | Commissioner: ALJ permissibly discounted treating opinions because they were conclusory, inconsistent with treatment notes, exams, imaging, and other medical opinions | Court: ALJ did not err; gave specific, record‑based reasons for discounting treating opinions and complied with treating‑physician rule |
| Whether the RFC omitted limitations (e.g., off‑task/absenteeism) and thus rendered VE testimony unreliable at step five | Abarzua: ALJ should have adopted limitations (marked workday/week interruptions; >3 absences/month; >10% off‑task) from treating opinions, which would preclude identified jobs | Commissioner: ALJ reasonably rejected those extreme limitations and posed the VE a hypothetical matching the RFC he adopted | Court: Held for Commissioner; RFC supported by substantial evidence and VE testimony addressed the RFC, so step‑five finding stands |
| Whether ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence given conflicting evidence | Abarzua: Objective findings and treating opinions support greater restrictions | Commissioner: Conservatively treated evidence, relied on consultative exams, imaging, conservative treatment, and claimant’s daily activities | Court: Substantial evidence supports ALJ’s RFC determination |
| Whether ALJ failed to develop the record when not crediting treating opinions | Abarzua: ALJ should have further developed record to resolve gaps supporting treating opinions | Commissioner: Record was adequate; ALJ reviewed and discussed treatment notes and opinions | Court: No duty‑to‑develop error; ALJ had sufficient evidence and explained weight assigned |
Key Cases Cited
- Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1999) (describes five‑step disability evaluation process)
- Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008) (treating‑physician rule and ALJ duty to explain weight given)
- Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 2004) (factors ALJ must consider when declining controlling weight for treating source)
- Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s opinion not dispositive on ultimate disability issue)
- Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 2002) (substantial‑evidence standard of review)
- Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1996) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (administrative factfinding and medical evidence standard)
- Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2012) (burden allocation at steps)