27 I. & N. Dec. 496
BIA2018Background
- Husband and wife from Venezuela obtained adjustment of status in 2000 based on a special immigrant religious-worker petition naming the husband as a minister, though he never worked as a minister.
- The visa petition and supporting documents claimed the husband was an ordained, salaried minister at St. Mark Catholic Church; the husband’s adjustment application and G-325A likewise listed minister as his occupation.
- In 2011, at a Miami airport deferred inspection, the husband admitted he never worked at St. Mark and that he had signed paperwork to obtain permanent residence as a religious worker.
- DHS charged removability under INA §§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 237(a)(1)(A) for fraud/willful misrepresentation of a material fact; IJ found respondents not credible and sustained removability based on willful misrepresentation.
- Respondents argued they did not know the applications contained false statements because the documents were in English and they could not read/understand them; they blamed a paid representative.
- BIA affirmed: respondents’ signatures created a strong presumption they knew and assented to the applications’ contents; IJ’s adverse credibility findings and inference of knowledge (or authorization) were not clearly erroneous, so removability was sustained.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether respondents willfully misrepresented a material fact on immigration applications | Respondents: They did not know contents; documents were in English and not translated; representative prepared them | DHS: Signatures and documentary admissions establish knowledge/authorization of false statements; credibility supports willfulness | Willful misrepresentation found—signatures create strong presumption of knowledge; respondents failed to rebut it |
| Whether a signature on an immigration form permits an inference of knowledge | Respondents: Signature alone insufficient when signer cannot read English and was represented | DHS: Signature gives strong presumption of knowledge absent fraud/duress; deliberate avoidance is not a defense | Signature establishes strong presumption; respondents did not show fraud/deception by representative; presumption stands |
| Sufficiency of IJ’s adverse credibility and inferences based on record | Respondents: IJ erred; record insufficient to show willfulness (citing Ortiz-Bouchet) | DHS: IJ reasonably found inconsistencies and implausibility; could infer knowledge/authorization | IJ’s credibility findings and permissive inferences upheld as not clearly erroneous |
| Whether deliberate avoidance of reading/translation negates willfulness | Respondents: Claimed inability to read English justified lack of knowledge | DHS: Failure to translate or inquire shows deliberate avoidance; law not sympathetic to deliberate noninquiry | Deliberate avoidance does not excuse misrepresentation; willfulness can be found on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1979) (knowledge of falsity satisfies scienter for willfulness)
- Zhi Wei Pang v. BCIS, 448 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2006) (applicant must rebut presumption of knowledge from signed application)
- Thompson v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2015) (signature on form establishes strong presumption of knowledge and assent)
- Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 714 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2013) (distinguishable where signature was forged and IJ found no personal willful misrepresentation)
- Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (ignorance of contents insufficient to avoid obligations absent fraud or misrepresentation)
- United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1993) (deliberate avoidance of reading a form does not excuse false statements)
- United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d 736 (11th Cir. 2010) (materiality defined as having natural tendency to influence decision)
- Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (factual findings plausible in light of record are not clearly erroneous)